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The development of substantive patent law is principally associated with the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit).
The Patent and Trademark Office (PTO), the central agency in the patent
system, is largely thought to play a negligible role in the evolution of
substantive patent law standards. This Article challenges this view and
argues that the PTO has a considerable effect on the development of
substantive standards-one that drives substantive patent law in an
expansive direction. It begins by focusing on the PTO's inevitable need to
develop its own views on substantive patent law. It then identifies and
explains how key elements of the administrative structure of the Agency, as
well as its relationship with the Federal Circuit, generally push the PTO's
views on substantive patent law in a patent-protection direction.
Significantly, this Article also explores how the PTO's tendency to expand
the patentability standards, in turn, creates pressure on the Federal Circuit
to enunciate legal standards that are expansive in nature. Finally, it
examines multiple mechanisms which could improve the PTO's ability to
develop substantive patent law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal
Circuit) has been recognized as "perhaps the single most significant
institutional innovation in the field of intellectual property in the last quarter-
century."1 The Federal Circuit, which is vested with near exclusive
jurisdiction over patent appeals, was created in 1982 in large part to bring
uniformity to the application and development of patent law.2 While the
standards of patentability are defined by statute, 3 they are only skeletal in
1 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7 (2003).
2 See Lawrence Baum, Specializing the Federal Courts: Neutral Reforms or Efforts
to Shape Judicial Policy?, 74 JUDICATURE 217, 223 (1991); Harold H. Bruff, Specialized
Courts in Administrative Law, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 329, 330 (1991); Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1,
7 (1989).
3 Patents may issue for "any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter," 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), that is not "obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art," id § 103, and that is
described "in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art.. .to make and use the same .... Id. § 112.
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structure.4 The Patent Act thus demands legal interpretation to infuse it with
any practical meaning. The Federal Circuit is widely recognized as playing a
salient role in the development of substantive patent law. 5 It is generally
agreed that the appellate court has increased legal uniformity and
predictability, 6 but there is disagreement as to whether the appellate court has
been successful in improving the quality of patent law.7
One of the chief complaints against the Federal Circuit is its adoption of
overly permissive patentability standards and its dramatic expansion of the
scope of patentable subject matter.8 Substantive patent law standards are
critical to ensuring that the underlying goal of the patent system-promoting
innovation-is well-served.9 While patents promote innovation by giving a
time-limited exclusive right in order to induce investment in new inventions,
patents also impose significant costs on consumers and innovators-higher
4 See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 51, 53 (2010) ("[T]he patent code, much like the Sherman Act, is a common law
enabling statute, leaving ample room for courts to fill in the interstices or to create
doctrine emanating solely from Article III's province."); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLuM. L. REV.
1035, 1041 (2003) ("[T]he history of the patent statute as well as its language strongly
suggest that Congress has delegated policymaking responsibility in patent law to the
judiciary.").
5 John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as "Prime Percolator": A Prescription for
Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. REV. 657, 665 (2009) ("[T]he
Federal Circuit generally provides the last word on interpretive questions in substantive
patent law.").
6 E.g., Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 8.
7 Uniformity and quality are distinct attributes. See Craig Allen Nard & John F.
Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law's Uniformity Principle, 101 Nw. U. L. REV. 1619, 1620
(2007) (arguing that "uniformity is not a proxy for quality" and outlining a number of
critiques of the Federal Circuit's patent law jurisprudence).
8 FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5-6 (2003), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/l0/innovationrpt.pdf (arguing that the Federal Circuit's
nonobviousness standards are too low and allow for excessive patenting); ADAM B. JAFFE
& JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 36-37 (2004); Rai, supra note 4, at
1054 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's application of the nonobviousness standard to
DNA sequences results in over-patenting of DNA sequences); see also Jay Dratler, Jr.,
Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299, 300 (2005)
(arguing that the Federal Circuit has unjustifiably enlarged the scope of patentable subject
matter); Michael North, The US. Expansion of Patentable Subject Matter: Creating a
Competitive Advantage for Foreign Multinational Companies?, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 111,
138 (2000) (same); John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L.
REV. 1139, 1140-41 (1999) (same).
9 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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prices and less access to the invention during the duration of the patent.' 0 If
the patentability standards become too expansive then the costs of patents
may cease to outweigh the benefits to consumers. For example, overly broad
patentability standards that result in the patenting of inventions that either
would have been developed without a patent or result in the issuance of
patents on inventions that are already in the public domain likely decrease
overall social welfare.II
To date, scholars have provided a number of explanations for the Federal
Circuit's unwarranted expansion of the patentability standards; including the
appellate court's capture by the patent bar and its clients12 and a lack of
scientific expertise. 13 This Article offers a novel explanation-one that
begins with recognition of the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) as an important institutional actor in the development of patent law.
In contrast to the Federal Circuit, the role the PTO has played in the setting
and the recent expansion of patentability standards has received scant
10 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (1998); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for Patent Races Over
Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REv. 803, 809-10 (2007) (assessing whether patent auctions can
be structured to benefit the social welfare).
11 See generally Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees' Market Power
Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-
Injunctive Remedies, 97 MICH. L. REv. 985, 1018-20 (1999); Christopher R. Leslie, The
Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101 (2006).
12 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 1, at 335 (arguing that, as predicted, the Federal
Circuit would become a pro-patent court due, at least in part, to special interest groups
including "the patent bar and its clients," who "would exert themselves to influence"
judicial selection for the court); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence
on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 251 (1998) (concluding that
findings of patent validity have been significantly higher since the establishment of the
Federal Circuit); Rai, supra note 4, at 1110-11 (discussing that Federal Circuit decisions
can be explained, in part, by capture). But see Golden, supra note 5, at 685-86
(dismissing arguments that the Federal Circuit has been captured); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
Patent Law, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Revolution, 11 SuP.
CT. ECON. REv. 1, 3 (2004) ("Despite the Federal Circuit's pro-patent holder reputation,
this summary reveals that claims of patent infringement are no more likely to succeed
since the Federal Circuit's advent.").
13 ROBERT PATRICK MERGES & JOHN FITZGERALD DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 299-327 (4th ed. 2007) (describing the Federal Circuit's
struggles with the written description requirement); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property
Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 827,
833-35 (1999) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's categorization of DNA-based
technology as "just another species of chemistry" is flawed and has led to overly
permissive application of the nonobviousness standard to DNA sequences);
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scholarly attention. The PTO lacks substantive rulemaking authority, 14 and
although it is statutorily authorized to adjudicate adverse decisions by patent
examiners, 15 the Federal Circuit does not give any formal deference to these
legal determinations. 16 Largely due to this lack of formal deference, it has
been widely believed that the Agency plays a trivial role in substantive patent
law development. 17 In fact, much of the existing literature fails to fully
appreciate the extent of the Agency's engagement in interpreting and
developing its own views of substantive patent law. Yet, a description of
patent law that focuses almost exclusively on the Federal Circuit is
misleading. Not only does the current literature largely ignore one of the
richest sources of patent law, Agency level biases that are most likely to
manifest in the PTO's announcement of its legal views have not been fully
explored. 18
Recent scholarship has begun to provide a more nuanced analysis of the
PTO's influence on the evolution of legal standards. Clarisa Long notes that
the PTO has emerged as a "more robust institutional player actively seeking
to influence patent policy"'19 by successfully lobbying for the passage of
legislation that empowered the Agency with more control over its
operations, 20 convincing the Supreme Court that its factual findings deserved
a more deferential standard of review than the Federal Circuit had been
14 See Merck & Co. v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that
because the Patent Act "does [not] grant the Commissioner the authority to issue
substantive rules ... the rule of controlling deference set forth in Chevron does not
apply").
15 35 U.S.C. § 6(b) (2006).
16 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who's Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 299 (2007) ("[T]he
Federal Circuit has repeatedly stated that it grants no deference whatsoever to PTO legal
interpretations.").
17 See, e.g., Golden, supra note 5, at 665 (noting that the Federal Circuit faces little
competition from the PTO in developing substantive patent law); Jonathan Masur, Patent
Inflation 1 (U. of Chi. Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 316, 2010), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=1623929 ("The Federal Circuit dictates the rules of substantive
patent law to the patent office via interpretations of the Patent Act. The PTO then grants
or denies patents according to those rules."); Nard, supra note 4, at 76 (describing the
PTO's role in substantive patent law as minor).
18 This is in contrast to examiner biases that have been discussed at length in the
literature. See infra Part IV.
19 Clarisa Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L.
REv. 1965, 1966 (2009).
2 0 Id at 1974-75.
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applying, 21 and testing the scope of its procedural rulemaking. 22 As a result
of these three events, she says, the PTO today enjoys an increased role as a
"supplier of legal rules and patent polices. ' 23 Yet she maintains the Federal
Circuit's dominance in substantive patent law, noting that the appellate court
"has been the major force affecting the shape of patent law .... 24
Jeffrey Lefstin argues that lack of explicit policy in current Federal
Circuit patent jurisprudence derives in large part from the Federal Circuit's
predecessor court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA), and its
unique relationship with the PTO.25 He contends that because the PTO's
interaction with a patent almost always ends upon its issuance, the Agency
has a limited ability to understand the consequences of granting a patent
under a particular legal rule and thus the Agency's views on substantive
patent law are not informed by long-range policy considerations. 26 Because
the CCPA's patent jurisdiction was limited to only patentability decisions by
the PTO, he argues that the court's views on substantive law suffered from
the same shortcomings of the PTO's. 27 According to Lefstin, the Federal
Circuit's adoption of CCPA case law as controlling precedent set the
contours of the appellate court's policy-deprived patent jurisprudence. 28
Thus, scholars have begun to explore the PTO's role in shaping the
contours of substantive law. This exploration, however, is far from complete.
Along this vein, this Article argues that the PTO plays an important role in
and has a strong practical effect on the evolution of substantive patent law
standards--one that generally pushes substantive patent law in an expansive
direction. Thus, this Article makes two primary contributions. First, it argues
that the PTO plays a much larger role in shaping substantive patent law
standards than is generally recognized in the patent law literature. Second, it
21 Id. at 1975-77. In Dickson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153-54, 165 (1999), the Court
held that the Administrative Procedure Act's more deferential "substantial evidence" or
"arbitrary and capricious" standards of review applied to the PTO's factual findings when
patent applicants appeal directly to the Federal Circuit. Prior to Zurko, the Federal Circuit
was applying the "clearly erroneous" standard of review to the PTO's factual conclusion.
22 Long, supra note 19, at 1979-83.
23 Id. at 1973-74.
2 4 Id. at 1971.
25 Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Constitution of Patent Law: The Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and the Shape of the Federal Circuit's Jurisprudence, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REv. 843, 847 (2010) ("The Federal Circuit was created by the merger of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) and the appellate division of the Court of
Claims.").
2 6 Id. at 853.
27 Id. at 853-54.
28 Id. at 885.
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provides an explanation for the expansion of patentability standards that
focuses on agency level incentives of the PTO.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part II of this Article argues that the
PTO is a much more vibrant actor in setting substantive patent standards than
is generally recognized in the literature. Even though the Agency must
follow court precedent and the Patent Act in making patentability decisions,
these legal instruments often fail to dictate the outcome of patentability
decisions to the Agency. The PTO routinely develops its own views of
substantive law in order to fill legal voids, largely in an effort to give
guidance to its examiners and patent applicants. Part II delineates why and
where PTO discretion with respect to substantive law exists, details the
mechanism the Agency utilizes to develop and articulate its own views of
substantive law, and begins to explore how the Agency has a strong practical
effect on setting substantive standards.
Because scholars have not focused on the PTO as a source of patent law,
the existing literature does not fully explore how the institutional design of
the PTO and its relationship with the Federal Circuit affect the Agency's
official positions on substantive law. Part III of this Article identifies and
explains how both the asymmetric review of PTO determinations and the
Agency's asymmetric funding generally push the PTO's views on
substantive patent law in a patent-protective direction. Unlike most
administrative agencies, substantive determinations by the PTO are not
subject to symmetric review by the Judiciary. It is only when the PTO denies
a patent that its decision may be immediately reviewed by the Federal
Circuit. In contrast, when the PTO grants a patent, its actions will go
uncontested for many years, if contested at all. Because the PTO seeks to
minimize scrutiny of its decision making, as well as its chances for reversal,
the asymmetric review of PTO decisions results in an institutional tendency
to expand substantive law.29
The asymmetric funding of the Agency largely reinforces this bias in
substantive decision making. The PTO is funded entirely through user fees;
the PTO's budget is set to the amount of its projected revenue. As a result,
the PTO's patent operating budget is derived, in large part, from patent
examination and post-allowance fees. However, the fees the PTO collects for
examining patent applications covers less than one-third of the cost to the
Agency for performing this service. In contrast, the post-allowance fees-
fees the Agency only collects when it grants a patent-are pure profit, as it
costs the Agency next to nothing to perform these services. Thus, the PTO's
29 Jonathan Masur, working independently, has recently explored the effect of
unidirectional review of PTO decisions and has largely reached the same conclusion.
Masur, supra note 17, at 2.
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strong funding incentives to grant patents also results in a systematic driving
force, shaping the Agency's views on substantive law in the patent-protective
direction.
Recognizing that the asymmetric incentives explored in Part III are likely
to be internalized by high-level officials at the PTO, Part IV begins to
examine the incentive structure of patent examiners. While the Agency uses
guidance documents and its own internal board to provide examiners with the
PTO's views on substantive law, there are other channels that high-ranking
officials may utilize to exert expansionary pressure on patent law. This Part
explores one such channel-the incentives of patent examiners. A number of
scholars have noted that patent examiner incentives are tilted towards
allowances.30 This Part provides a possible explanation for why the Agency
has chosen to structure examiner incentives in this manner.
In theory, the Federal Circuit could always rein in the expansive
substantive standards being applied by the PTO. Part V explores two
mechanisms, resulting from the PTO's overly permissive views of
substantive law, which create pressure for the Federal Circuit to enunciate
legal standards that drift in the expansive direction. First, once the PTO
begins making decisions on the patentability of inventions based on a
substantive standard that is too expansive, a susceptibility to lock-in may
arise, especially if the Federal Circuit is not given, in a timely manner, the
opportunity to consider whether the PTO's stance is desirable. Second, the
PTO's patent-protective views of substantive law skew the distribution of
patent denials before the Federal Circuit; the overwhelming majority of
patents denied by the PTO are likely to be invalid. Part V also examines how
this skewed distribution of cases may affect the evaluative and decisional
process of the Federal Circuit.
Finally, Part VI explores various policies that Congress could adopt to
either temper or eliminate the distortions to substantive patent law
development caused by both the asymmetric review of the Agency's
determinations and the PTO's financial incentives to grant patents. To
balance the review of PTO determinations, Part VI recommends enacting an
administrative proceeding whereby granted patents can be challenged by
third parties. To address the distortions caused by the PTO's financial
incentives to grant patents, Part VI considers both abolishing the disparity
between examination fees and costs to the PTO, and funding the Agency, at
least partially, through direct appropriations. As the aligning of fees and costs
in the examination process will likely leave the Agency with a continued
incentive to grant patents-the majority of the PTO's budget will still be
30 See infra notes 147-49.
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derived through post-allowance fees-Part VI ultimately recommends
eliminating, at least partially, the self-financing of the PTO.
II. THE PTO's UNDERAPPRECIATED ROLE IN SETTING SUBSTANTIVE
STANDARDS
Since 1790, Congress has provided a system for granting patents,
including the basic patentability requirements.31 However, up to this point,
the implementing legislation leaves ample room for gap-filling and
interpretation.32 It is widely recognized that the Judiciary, and in particular
the Federal Circuit, which has near exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals,
has played a salient role in filling this legal void.33
31 The first patent act gave the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, and the
Attorney General the authority to examine and issue patents. See Patent Act of 1790, ch.
7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 109-10 (1790). It was the Patent Act of 1836, however, that created
the PTO and vested it with the authority to administer the patent system. See Patent Act
of 1836, ch. 357, § 1, 5 Stat. 117, 117-18 (1836); see also Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L.
No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 100-376) (2006).
32 See Hon. Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?, 57 AM. U. L.
REv. 763, 766 (2008) ( "Since the very beginning of our nation, Congress has provided a
system for the granting of patents. However, up to now, the implementing legislation has
not been a great deal more specific than the Constitution itself .... ).
33 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 4, at 76-77; see also Federal Court Improvements Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (relevant provisions codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), (a)(4)(a) (2006). Prior to 1982,
patent appeals from district courts were heard by the respective regional circuit court and
appeals from PTO decisions on patentability were heard by the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals (CCPA). Thus, twelve regional circuit courts and the CCPA provided
legal interpretation and development of substantive patent law. The divergence of the
intermediate appellate court's patent rules from each other, see Baum, supra note 2, at
223; Dreyfuss, supra note 2, at 6-7, and from the rules of the PTO, Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966) ("We have observed a notorious difference between the
standards applied by the Patent Office and by the courts."), led to the creation of the
Federal Circuit.
The import of the Federal Circuit to the patent system has not been lost on scholars;
commentators have explored how nearly every facet of the institutional structure of the
appellate court affects the quality of patent law the court announces. See, e.g., Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age,
23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 815 (2008) (arguing that the Federal Circuit's "tendency to
emphasize precision at the expense of accuracy" stems in part from the political context
in which the court was created-namely that the court was created to bring uniformity to
patent law); Rochelle Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting: The PTO as Cause or Cure, 104
MICH. L. REv. 1559, 1570 (2006) (book review) [hereinafter Dreyfuss, Pathological
Patenting] (discussing how Federal Circuit judges have developed "thin skins" in part
because they do not have sister courts that criticize their decision making); Golden, supra
2011]
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In contrast to the Federal Circuit, there has been very little examination
or even acknowledgment of the important role and the practical effect the
PTO plays in setting substantive standards. The patent literature often
concludes that the PTO plays a trivial role in influencing substantive
standards because the Agency lacks substantive rulemaking authority and
that its views on substantive patent law are not entitled to the highly
deferential standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.3 4 However, this view ignores the reality of PTO
practice and the fact that the rule announced by the court may matter much
less than how the PTO chooses to implement it. In fact, much of the existing
literature fails to fully appreciate the extent to which the Agency is engaged
in interpreting and developing its own views of substantive patent law.35 The
prevailing view of the Agency is that of a clerk's office-examiners making
haphazard decisions without substantial guidance from higher-level
officials.36
This Part argues that the PTO is a much more vibrant actor and has a
much larger practical effect on substantive law development than is generally
recognized. On a daily basis, the PTO must make difficult substantive patent
law decisions on issues-such as the patentability of subject matter and
note 5, at 657 (arguing that the Federal Circuit's centralized legal control of patent law
results in ossification of law and suggesting increased Supreme Court involvement in
substantive patent law development); Nard & Duffy, supra note 7, at 1625, 1632 (arguing
that Federal Circuit jurisprudence lacks quality in part because it does not have an
audience-other sister courts-to write to and suggesting that the D.C. Circuit should
also have jurisdiction over patent appeals); Rai, supra note 4, at 1040 (arguing that the
Federal Circuit's formalistic jurisprudence stems from the appellate court's concern with
the inability of the district court and the PTO to accurately find facts).
34 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984); see, e.g., Golden, supra note 5, at 665 (noting that
"the Federal Circuit generally provides the last word on interpretive questions in
substantive patent law" because the Agency's legal determinations receive little
deference); Nard, supra note 4, at 76 (describing the PTO's role in substantive patent law
as minor); Rai, supra note 4, at 1053-54 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has been
hesitant to give the PTO proper deference to the Agency's factual findings, let alone any
formal deference to the PTO's legal decisions).
3 5 E.g., DAN L. BURK & MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND How THE
COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 168 (2009) (describing the PTO as having "virtually no policy
staff and-at least until recently-little experience or apparent inclination to take a
leadership role in setting patent policy"); Masur, supra note 17, at 2 ("The Federal Circuit
dictates the terms of substantive patent law to the patent office, which typically abides by
those terms and works to placate both the Federal Circuit and the patent applicants who
come before it.").
36 See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer, Patent Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 675, 704 (2009) ("Today, patent examination is fundamentally decentralized.
Examiners have enormous discretion about how they perform their mission.").
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standards for nonobviousness-that the Judiciary has struggled with for
years.37 In fact, the sheer volume of patentability decisions-roughly
470,000 a year38-suggest that courts cannot answer all (or even most) of the
difficult substantive questions that confront the PTO on a day-to-day basis.
Examiners are not filling this legal void in a completely random fashion.
Instead, the Agency has strong incentives to provide its employees with
guidance on these unsettled legal issues. Thus, the Agency routinely
develops views of substantive law that are binding on its own employees.
Finally, even without formal authority, the PTO is often setting de facto
substantive law because many of its determinations remain unchallenged.
Subpart A explores where and why PTO discretion exists with respect to
substantive law; subpart B explores the mechanisms that the PTO utilizes to
articulate the Agency's official views on substantive law; and subpart C
begins to examine how the PTO is, in effect, setting substantive standards,
even though its legal determinations are afforded no formal deference.
A. The PTO 's Unavoidable Discretion
Despite the PTO's obligation to follow the patent code and court
precedent, 39 there are a substantial number of areas in which neither source
of law dictates the outcome of a PTO decision. These areas of discretion
exist in part because the PTO is required to determine the applicability of law
37 See, e.g., BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 157 ("Courts have repeatedly sought
to draw lines between software inventions that involved physical transformation and
those that represented merely mental steps or mathematical algorithms. At each turn,
those lines quickly eroded and had to be abandoned as unworkable."); Nard, supra note
4, at 94 ("Over the years, the courts have constructed various tests [for claims for process
inventions] .... These tests have proven to be too unpredictable and unruly-the
standards therein offered very little guidance to the bar and inventors.").
38 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 112 tbl. 1 (2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ar/2009/2009annualreport.pdf [hereinafter
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT].
39 Scholars have noted that, at times, administrative agencies decline to be bound by
adverse circuit decisions and have termed this behavior "nonacquiescence." See, e.g.,
Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Reversz, Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative
Agencies, 98 YALE L. J. 679, 681 (1989). While the PTO has from time to time refused to
follow Federal Circuit precedent, these instances have been rare. Most agencies that
engage in nonacquiescence cite horizontal uniformity (treating claimants/applicants
similarly at the agency level) as the primary reason for its behavior. See id. at 695 (Social
Security Administration's stated reason for nonacquiescence); id. at 714 (Internal
Revenue Service's stated reason for nonacquiescence). As the Federal Circuit provides
uniformity to substantive patent law, the PTO lacks the primary incentive to partake in
nonacquiescence.
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to new technologies that the relevant lawmaker could not have anticipated; it
must sometimes resolve ambiguities in statutory patent law and precedential
court opinions; and it is required, at times, to fill gaps in the law.
1. The Inevitable Mismatch Between Old Legal Rules and New
Technologies
The PTO develops its own views of substantive patent law when it
determines the patentability of new technology-in particular technology
that has never been addressed by precedent or the existing statutes. 40 Existing
rules are not always adaptable to emerging fields of science; they cannot be
applied mechanically to reach a determinate result. When inventors begin to
file patent applications on these new technologies, the PTO will fill this legal
void with its own interpretation and development of substantive law to bridge
the gap that exists between the emerging technology and existing patent law
standards. 41
Take, for example, genomics-the science of heredity and variation in
living organisms. The PTO has faced a number of challenging patentability
questions with respect to this field, including genes, expressed sequence tags
(fragments of genes),42 and antibodies. 43 The Agency has provided
40 While the onward march of science is anticipated, the path it chooses to take is
often unanticipated.
41 There are three reasons to believe that the PTO will frequently have to develop its
own views of substantive patent law in response to emergent technologies. First,
technological innovation is dynamic; new fields are constantly emerging. Second, the
initiative to extend patenting to an emerging technology lies, in the first instance, with
inventors and commercial developers, not with Congress, the PTO, or the courts. Third,
because new technology is often unforeseeable, the courts and Congress are unlikely to
provide the PTO with substantial guidance in making these decisions.
42 The PTO rejects patent applications for express sequence tags under its guidelines
requiring biotechnology patents to have a utility that is "specific and substantial." Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). When these rejections
were appealed to the Federal Circuit, the court not only affirmed the rejection but also
blessed the PTO guidelines and essentially adopted the PTO's reasoning as its own. See
In re Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1372, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2005) ("The [PTO]'s standards for
assessing whether a claimed invention has a specific and substantial utility comport with
this court's interpretation .... We agree with the [Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences] that the facts here are similar to those in Brenner.").
43 See Enzo Biochem., Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002);
cf Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352-53 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (citing the PTO's 2001 guidelines in support of a statement regarding the nature of




examiners with substantial guidance on answering these questions,44
including the highly controversial issue of whether genes should even be
patent eligible. 45 The PTO developed its own views of substantive law when
it began issuing these patents for "isolated and purified" genes over thirty
years ago. 46 The Agency has also determined how to apply the patentability
standards for bioinformatics-the research, development, or application of
computational tools and approaches for expanding the use of biological
44 See Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1098; Guidelines for
Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112 1, "Written
Description" Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099 (Jan. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Written
Description Guidelines].
45 Some critics of gene patents have voiced ethical objections. See NUFFIELD
COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF PATENTING DNA 47-48 (2002) (arguing against
the patenting of genes); JEREMY RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY 65 (1998) (noting
religious objections to the patenting of genes). Others express concerns over the proper
balance between the need for commercial incentives to develop drugs for diseases and the
virtues of open science. See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Gene Patent Dilemma:
Balancing Commercial Incentives with Health Needs, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 65,
89-90 (2002) (noting that patents on the breast cancer gene have had a negative effect on
research in the field); Jon F. Merz et al., Diagnostic Testing Fails the Test, 415 NATURE
577 (2002) (noting that access to diagnostic tests for hereditary haemochromatosis has
been inhibited by patents on HFE genes). Much of the legal debate has focused on
whether genes constitute patentable subject matter or are products of nature and hence
unpatentable. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews & Jordan Paradise, Essay, Gene Patents: The
Need for Bioethics Scrutiny and Legal Change, 5 YALE J. OF HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS
403, 405 (2005) (arguing that patents on genes should not be granted because they do not
constitute patentable subject matter); Philippe Jacobs & Geertrui Van Overwalle, Gene
Patents: A Different Approach, 23 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 505, 505 (2001) (arguing that
patents should not be granted for DNA but only for downstream medical goods); see also
Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic Code, 71 TENN. L.
REV. 707, 715 (2004) ("With respect to DNA gene patents, the doctrines of utility,
nonobviousness, enablement, and written description have particularly challenged both
the PTO and the courts as they have determined whether the particular features of a DNA
molecule call for special application of these requirements.").
46 See Mammalian Methallothionein Promoter System, U.S. Pat. No. 4,601,978
(filed Nov. 24, 1982) (issued July 22, 1986); Process for Producing Biologically
Functional Molecular Chimeras, U.S. Pat. No. 4,237,224 (filed Jan. 4, 1979) (issued Dec.
2, 1980). Ever since, the patenting of genes has been surrounded in ethical and legal
controversy. Isolated and purified genes are distinct from genes found in nature in that
they have been extracted from their cellular environment and further processed to
separate the particular segment of DNA of interest from other DNA in the genome. While
isolated and purified genes have uses that are distinct from genes found in nature, isolated
and purified genes still maintain their informational character-they still provide a
blueprint for protein synthesis.
2011]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
data-by largely treating these patent applications as computer programs.47
Additionally, the PTO has decided to allow patents on tax strategies, 48 and
has begun to decide patentability issues relating to synthetic biology, an
emerging field involving engineering molecular building blocks.
2. Gaps in the Law
The PTO also develops its view of substantive law when it fills in gaps,
and synthesizes or clarifies existing legislation and court precedent. However
cognizant courts are of the need to issue opinions that clarify the law's
demands for similarly situated parties, courts rarely eliminate the discretion
of other bodies in applying these opinions to later cases. Thus, even when the
PTO is merely implementing court precedent, the Agency plays a non-trivial
part in patent law's development and practical effect.
Consider, for example, the PTO's actions in the aftermath of the
Supreme Court's 1980 decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which held that
"human-made, genetically engineered bacterium" is patentable subject
matter. 49 The Agency concluded that there was no subject matter bar to
patenting living things outside of "a human being," 50 and began to allow
patents on plants51 and other multicellular organisms, such as genetically
altered oysters. 52 More recently, the Supreme Court case, Bilski v. Kappos,
47 The PTO has advised bioinformatics applicants to follow computer programming
guidelines set forth in sections 2106.01 and 2106.02 of Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure. See infra note 60; see also U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION TRAINING MATERIALS 29-30 (Mar. 25, 2008),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/written.pdf (bioinformatics example).
48 See William A. Drennan, The Patented Loophole: How Should Congress Respond
to this Judicial Invention?, 59 FLA. L. REV. 229, 229 (2007); see also Hearing on Issues
Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the Subcomm. on Select Revenue
Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 6 (2006) (statement of James
A. Toupin, General Counsel, United States Patent and Trademark Office) ("We at the
USPTO recognize that the patenting of tax planning strategies has raised a number of
concerns in Congress, the IRS, and the financial services community.").
49 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980).
50 Policy Statement on the Patentability of Animals, 1077 OFF. GAZ. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 (Apr. 21, 1987), reprinted in DONALD S. CHISUM, 9 CHISUM ON
PATENTS app. 24-1 (2005) ("[T]he Patent and Trademark Office now considers
nonnaturally occurring, non-human multicellular living organisms, including animals, to
be patentable subject matter.").
51 J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int'l, Inc., 534 U.S. 124, 127 (2001)
("We hold that utility patents may be issued for plants.").
52 Ex parte Allen, No. 86-1790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425, 1426 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 1987)
(holding that claimed polyploid oysters constitute patentable subject matter).
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decided what test governs whether a claim to a process constitutes patentable
subject matter.53 The Court announced that the machine-or-transformation
test-that subject matter is eligible for patent protection if "(1) it is tied to a
particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a
different state or thing" 54-was not the sole test for patentability but instead
only an investigational tool for determining the patentability of certain
processes. 55
Even putting aside the fact that the PTO must determine when the
machine-or-transformation test is alone sufficient to reject a process claim,
the PTO cannot even begin to implement this two-part test until the Agency
defines what constitutes a particular machine and when a particular article is
transformed into a different state or thing.56 Further, the Court ultimately
invalidated the patent in Bilski as an unpatentable abstract idea; the
concurring opinion adroitly noted that the majority "never provides a
satisfying account of what constitutes an unpatentable abstract idea." 57 The
PTO fills these legal voids with its own views of substantive law, subject to
additional guidance or revision of its views by the courts. 58
53 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
54 Id. at 3224.
55 Id. at 3227.
56 The PTO's definition of these terms can have a dramatic effect on consumer
welfare and innovation. Specifically, the vitality of patents on computer implemented
inventions (i.e., software patents) may be threatened depending on the PTO's stance on
whether a general purpose computer qualifies as a "particular" machine within the
meaning of the machine-or-transformation test. The PTO issued interim examination
guidelines that made clear that for computer-implemented processes (i.e., computer-
implemented software), a general-purpose computer must be disclosed to be programmed
to perform the method steps. These program steps create a machine with sufficient
specificity to qualify as patent eligible subject matter. See Memorandum from Andrew H.
Hirshfeld, Acting Deputy Comm'r for Patent Examination Pol'y, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Office, to TC Directors 6 (Aug. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/2009-08-
25_interim 101_instructions.pdf (laying out a rule that a general purpose computer
qualifies as a "particular machine" when programmed to perform method steps, thereby
allowing the patenting of computer software).
57 Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3236 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58 On the same day that the Supreme Court issued the Bilski v. Kappos decision, the
PTO issued a two-page memorandum that instructed examiners on how to recalibrate
subject-matter determinations in light of the decision. Memorandum from Robert W.
Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm'r for Patent Examination Pol'y, U.S. Pat. & Trademark
Office, to Patent Examining Corps (June 28, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilskiguidance 28jun2010.pdf. Less than thirty
days later, the PTO published significantly more detailed guidelines in the Federal
Register and solicited public comment. Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter
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B. Mechanisms for Developing and Articulating PTO Law
Because scholars and policymakers have overlooked the extent to which
the PTO sets its own internal law, the institutional mechanisms through
which the PTO crafts and enforces its substantive patent law policies have
been largely ignored. This Article attempts to fill this gap in the literature by
examining how the Agency develops and articulates its views on substantive
patent law. Examiners do not have total discretion in filling legal voids; high-
level officials have strong incentives to provide guidance to the Agency's
6,000 patent examiners and to promote consistency in the examination
process.59 This subpart explores the Agency's two primary, non-mutually
exclusive pathways to articulate and develop its own substantive patent law:
guidance documents and decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences (BPAI).
The first way that high-level officials articulate the Agency's viewpoint
on substantive law issues is through guidance documents, such as general
policy statements, guidelines, memoranda, and manuals. The most well-
known guidance document is the massive Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP),60 which is referred to as the "bible" of patent
examination. In contrast to legislative rules, guidance documents do not
appear to have the force of law and hence are exempt from the formal
procedural requirements under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).61
Thus, the amount of public participation and transparency associated with
Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,922, 43,922
(July 27, 2010) [hereinafter Bilski Guidance]. These guidelines provided examiners with
more guidance on when an invention was drawn to ineligible subject matter by
delineating factors to take into consideration when making this determination. Id. at 43,
925-26.
59 See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr. & David A. Koplow, The Fourth Bite at the Apple:
A Study of the Operation and Utility of the Social Security Administration's Appeals
Council, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 199, 266 (1990) ("Whether this appellate authority
resides in the head of the agency or in some lesser body, the traditional scheme of
administrative law generally places responsibility for generating policy at the top of the
appellate pyramid.").
60 An entire chapter is dedicated to the PTO's position on substantive patent law.
U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINATION PROCEDURE § 2100 (8th ed., 8th rev., July 2010) [hereinafter MPEP].
61 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (2006) (requiring an agency that promulgates legislative
rules to give public notice, an opportunity for comment, and the issuance of a "concise
and general statement of basis and purpose"). For an excellent discussion of
nonlegislative rules and why agencies may rely on them over legislative rules, see
generally John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 893 (2004).
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guidance documents varies greatly.62 Examination guidelines that the
Agency publishes for notice and comment allow opportunity for public input
and some transparency in the development process. 63 However, more often
than not, the opportunity for public participation on guidance formation is
very limited and the process of development is more or less a black box. The
PTO appears to routinely rely on guidance documents that are not available
to the public-such as internally distributed memoranda and internal
training-to provide patent examiners with guidance on substantive patent
law issues.64 At least some of these rules appear to have been developed
within a technology center, where more senior patent examiners and heads of
the technology centers provide guidance to examiners directly. For example,
it took the PTO close to twenty years before the Agency provided the public
with its reasons for allowing patents on "isolated and purified" genes. 65
The second way the PTO develops and articulates its views on
substantive law is through the BPAI. 66 In order to obtain a patent, an inventor
62 In practice, the guidelines may include a short synopsis of how the PTO perceives
the current state of the law, decision trees that the patent examiner should utilize in
deciding whether an invention meets the substantive patent law at issue, and a set of
detailed examples with analyses of how they either meet or fail to meet the legal
requirement at issue. See, e.g., Revised Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent
Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. § 112, 1 "Written Description" Requirement, 64 Fed.
Reg. 71,427, 71,434-37 (Dec. 21, 1999).
63 See, e.g., DAVID J. KAPPOs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, SUBJECT MATrER ELIGIBILITY OF COMPUTER READABLE MEDIA (2010),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/notices/1 01_crm_20100127.pdf; Policy
Statement on the Patentability of Animals, supra note 50, at app. 24-2; Written
Description Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1100-01; Utility Examination Guidelines, 66
Fed. Reg. at 1098; Bilski Guidance, 75 Fed. Reg. at 43,922-26.
64 See, e.g., Transcript of Public Hearing On Use of the Patent System to Protect
Software-Related Inventions Before the PTO at 54 (Feb. 11, 1994) (Statement of Allen
M. Lo), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/hearings/software/arlington/valo.html
(describing the PTO's policy of nonimplemented versus implemented computer software,
stating that "a lot of these guidelines are not published," and that he only has this
information from being a patent examiner); Mainak H. Mehta & Diallo T. Crenshaw,
Patent Prosecution and Enforcement Tips in View of In re Bilski, SuGHRUE MION PLLC,
http://www.sughrue.com/publications/list.aspx?listType=pubs (scroll to article title at
"3/27/2009") (discussing an internal PTO memorandum that encouraged examiners to
apply an arguably new test for patentability that the PTO later adopted as its position in a
court case before the Federal Circuit).
65 Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. at 1095.
66 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006). The Board sits in panels of three composed of a
combination of the Director of the PTO, the Deputy Director, the Assistant Director, and
the Administrative Patent Judges. MPEP, supra note 60, § 1202.
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must file a patent application with the PTO, and, in a process known as
patent prosecution, she must try to persuade the PTO that her invention meets
the patentability standards. 67 A PTO official known as an examiner will
eventually review the application and determine whether the invention merits
the award of a patent. If the PTO grants a patent, the owner obtains the right
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing
into the United States the patented invention for twenty years from the filing
date of the patent. 68 If the examiner rejects the patent application for failing
to meet one or more of the patentability requirements, then the patent
applicant can pursue an appeal before the BPAI. The BPAI is composed of
administrative patent judges (APJs)--"persons of competent legal knowledge
and scientific ability"69-appointed by the Secretary of Commerce upon
consultation with the Director of the PTO. Each APJ has a law degree, has
been admitted to at least one state bar, and holds at least a bachelor's degree
in science or engineering. 70 While the BPAI's primary function is the
promotion of internal consistency in the examination process by finding and
correcting examiner error,71 the BPAI can also either develop or implement
the PTO's views on substantive law. 72 The lawmaking function of BPAI
67 See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
6 8 Id. § 154(a).
69 1d. §6.
70 Vice Chief Judge James Moore, Vice Chief Judge Allen MacDonald, Judge
Kenneth Hairston, & Judge Murriel Crawford, A View Behing [sic] the Curtain: The
BPAI Decision Making Process, UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
LEGAL SOCIETY, http://www.usptols.org/uploads/AViewBehind theCurtain_6 -
UPDATE100408.pdf.
71 There are three types of BPAI decisions: (1) precedential, (2) informative, and (3)
routine. MICHAEL FLEMING, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2
(REvISIoN 7): PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS AND BINDING PRECEDENT 5-7 (2008), available
at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sop2.pdf (discussing binding precedent
on the BPAI). The vast majority of BPAI decisions are labeled as routine.
72 There are a number of reasons why the BPAI is likely to reflect the policy
preferences of the Agency, including that the APJs are aware of the PTO's substantive
views of patent law as the Chief Judge of the BPAI regularly participates in meetings that
develop the PTO's position involving substantive patent law. In addition, the Chief Judge
of the BPAI retains substantive authority over the BPAI, including designating the
administrative patent judges for each panel. MICHAEL FLEMING, U.S. PATENT &
TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND
INTERFERENCES STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE I (REvISION 13): ASSIGNMENT OF
JUDGES TO MERITS PANELS, MOTIONS PANELS, AND EXPANDED PANELS 1 (2009),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/sopl.pdf (discussing the Chief
Administrative Patent Judge's role in the designation of merit panels). Therefore, the
Chief Judge could use this ability to designate panels that will reflect the policy views of
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adjudications generally takes one of two forms. First, there are cases in the
common law mode that involve the application of established PTO views on
substantive patent law issues to particular facts. Second, there are cases in
which the BPAI uses the immediate controversy as a vehicle to announce a
new viewpoint without much regard for the particular facts. 73
To be sure, examiners could deviate from the PTO's official position on
substantive law,74 but there are many reasons to think such behavior would
be unlikely: following the PTO's position is the quick and simple thing to
do;75 examiners are under enormous time constraints and are unlikely to have
the PTO. Finally, if the BPAI decides to stray from Agency policy, the Director of the
PTO can utilize his substantial supervisory role over the BPAI to influence its decisions.
35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2006). While this authority is not absolute-the administrative patent
judges are not mere "alter egos" of the Director-the Director of the PTO has the power
to determine which BPAI decisions shall have binding precedential effect on the BPAI,
ensuring that the Director has the power over which opinions have a lasting effect on the
PTO decision making process. FLEMING, supra note 66, at 5-7 (discussing binding
precedent on the BPAI). In addition, the Director can use his power to designate.BPAI
panels that "he hopes will render the decision he desires, even upon rehearing." In re
Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1994). The Director even has the power to
designate himself to sit on BPAI panels. Most recently, Director David Kappos joined a
precedential BPAI opinion that clarified the BPAI standard of review of examiners'
rejections. Exparte Frye, No. 2009-006013, 94 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072, 1075-76, (B.P.A.I. Feb.
26, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/prec/fd09OO6013.pdf (holding that no
deference is given to positions taken by the examiner when considering an appellant's
argument specifically challenging the examiner's findings); see also Ex parte Alappat,
No. 91-1277, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d 1340, 1340 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 22, 1992) ("Before Manbeck,
commissioner, Comer, deputy commission[er], Samuels, assistant commissioner, Serota,
chairman, Calvert, vice chairman, and Linquist, Thomas, and Krass, examiners-in-
chief."). The passage of the 1999 American Inventors Protection Act (AIPA) elevated the
position of the head of the PTO from Commissioner to Director. Pub. L. No. 106-113,
sec. 4713, § 3(a)(1), 113 Stat. 1501A-572-578 (1999).
73 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (B.P.A.I. Sept. 26, 2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/bpai/decisions/inform/fd022257.pdf, represents this type
of action, though patent examiners appear to have been told beforehand to begin to reject
patent applications that did not meet the PTO's machine or transformation test. Ex parte
Allen, No. 86-1790, 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1425 (B.P.A.I. Apr. 3, 1987) (PTO extends protection
to multicellular organism that is non-naturally occurring).
74 1 discuss the incentives of individual examiners in Part IV.
75 Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals
and the Like--Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J.
1311, 1364 (1992) ("Staff members acting upon matters to which the guidance
documents pertain will routinely and indeed automatically apply those documents, rather
than considering their policy afresh before deciding whether to apply them.").
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time to reflect upon and question official PTO policy;76 and failure to follow
the Agency's official views on substantive law can have negative career
repercussions for examiners and even result in termination. 77
C. PTO's Lawmaking Power
While the PTO's views of substantive law are likely to be followed by
patent examiners, the Federal Circuit affords no deference to the Agency's
76 There are currently over 735,000 patent applications awaiting initial review.
PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 38, at 114 tbl.3. It has been
estimated that examiners spend roughly eighteen hours on an application, during which
time they must read and review the patent application and any amendments, search for
and read pertinent prior art, explain in writing why the invention does not meet the
patentability requirements, and possibly be interviewed by the prosecuting attorney. Mark
A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1499-1500
(2001).
77 The PTO monitors its examiners through a variety of quality assurance
mechanisms that are likely to detect examiners who fail to follow PTO directives. These
can be divided into three categories. The first set of quality assurance mechanisms are
conducted within each technology center and include the collection and analysis of
statistics on various work flow product, the assignment of senior examiners to review all
work of junior examiners, and the second-pair-of-eyes review. See Mark Lemley &
Bhaven N. Sampat, Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Office Outcomes 7
(Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 369, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1329091 (noting that junior examiner
work is subject to review by senior examiners). The second-pair-of-eyes review includes
a senior examiner and an examination panel performing an additional review on an
application that has been allowed. Patent Quality Improvement: Expansion of the Second-
Pair-of-Eyes Review, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat21/action/q3pl7a.htm. This program was
initially implemented for business method patents only but was later expanded for certain
advanced technical fields, such as semiconductors, telecommunication, and
biotechnology. Id. The Office of Patent Quality Assurance (OPQA) performs the second
set of quality assurance mechanisms, including review of a random sampling of allowed
patent applications. Historically the OPQA reviews as few as 4% of allowed applications.
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, AUDIT REPORT No. PTD-9977-7-
0001, PATENT QUALITY CONTROLS ARE INADEQUATE 3, graph 1 (1997), available at
http://www.oig.doc.gov/oig/reports/1997/USPTO-PTD-9977-7-09-1997.pdf. The third
set of quality assurance is review of rejected patent applications by the BPAI. In 2009,
the BPAI reversed close to 25% of examiner's denials. See Receipts and Dispositions by
Technology Centers for Ex Parte Appeals, BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS &
INTERFERENCES, http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/bpai/docs/receipts/fy2009.pdf
(listing statistics). The PTO has tied error rates in examination to performance
evaluations and an unacceptable error rate can lead to an examiner's termination. USPTO
"Quality" Initiatives Mean Slower Production or Unfair Enforcement, PAT. OFF. PROF.
ASs'N NEWS, Sept.-Oct. 2003, at 1, 2.
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stance on substantive patent law issues. Thus, at first glance, the PTO's
power to declare law is limited. While this Article discusses why the Federal
Circuit is likely to entrench the PTO's views on substantive law in Part V,
the following subpart argues that because so few granted patents are actually
litigated, the Federal Circuit is unlikely to see enough cases to fully control
the development of substantive patent law. Thus, the PTO's views on
substantive patent law, which are not reviewed by the appellate court, are de
facto law.
The Federal Circuit itself has remarked that it sees "at most no more than
0.015% of the patents in force." 78 Of course, the appellate court does not
need to review every patent to control the development of law; it needs to
review only one patent in a class of patents that are treated similarly under
the PTO's official stance on a substantive law issue. However, especially
with emerging technology, any single case may not present the full range of
the PTO's views. Parties to an individual case make arguments that best
serve their claims or broader objectives. These litigant-driven decisions
necessarily constrain the set of legal standards that the court can address.
Thus, the Federal Circuit may need to review a significant number of patents
in a particular class to review the full range of the PTO views on emergent
technology (i.e., PTO's views on patentable subject matter, novelty,
nonobviousness, etc.).
The very small set of issued patents that are litigated make it unlikely
that the set of issues that come before the Federal Circuit are a representative
sample of the PTO's views on substantive patent law. There is growing
empirical evidence that litigated patents differ substantially from patents that
are never litigated.79 For example, litigated patents tend to come
disproportionately from certain industries. Patents on medical devices and
mechanics are much more likely to be litigated than semiconductor or
chemistry patents.80 Further, the PTO maintains that the patent applications
before it differ in significant ways from the set of patents that the Federal
Circuit reviews. In particular, the Agency contends that it rejects a significant
78 Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1472 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(Mayer, J., concurring).
79 John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 437-38 (2004); see
also John R. Allison & Thomas W. Sager, Valuable Patents Redux: On the Enduring
Merit of Using Patent Characteristics to Identify Valuable Patents, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1769
(2007); John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & Joshua Walker, Patent Quality and
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants (Stanford Law & Econ. Olin, Working Paper
No. 398, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1677785 (noting that 93.7% of the
most-litigated patents-patents litigated at least eight times-are software patents).
80 Allison, Lemley & Walker, supra note 79.
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number of patent applications on the written description requirement alone
whereas the Federal Circuit rarely reviews such cases. 81
Notably, even when the Federal Circuit does review the PTO's official
position on substantive patent law, it is important to realize that up to this
review, the PTO's viewpoints were likely governing patent applications for a
significant period of time. 82 While the PTO can develop and implement its
stance on substantive law in a relatively short timeframe, it will generally
take years, and sometimes even decades, before the Federal Circuit is given
the opportunity to review the PTO's views on substantive law through a
granted patent.
III. THE PTO's ASYMMETRIC INCENTIVES
Part II demonstrated that the PTO has a much larger practical effect on
the development of substantive law than is generally recognized.
Recognizing the import of the PTO in setting substantive standards gives rise
to a number of significant implications. First, as a descriptive matter, the
account of patent law that focuses exclusively on the Federal Circuit is
misleading. The current literature generally ignores one of the richest sources
of substantive patent law. Second, because the PTO's views on substantive
law have a significant effect on patent policy, the process by which the PTO
crafts these rules should come under more scrutiny. Currently, much of PTO
policymaking occurs in a black box, with little transparency or oversight.
Third, the current policy discussions about patent reform and industry-
specific patent law have largely overlooked a crucial player in current policy-
setting. For example, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley have persuasively argued
that substantive patent law should be tailored to better reflect the industry-
specific nature of innovation.8 3 They delineate "policy levers" within
substantive patent law that can take into account economic considerations of
how innovation works in various technological fields. 84 Yet, they fail to give
any serious consideration to granting the PTO substantive rulemaking
authority, noting that the Agency does not have personnel trained with any
81 Oral Arguments at 23:20, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336
(No. 2008-1248-2), available at http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/oral-argument-
recordings/2008-1248-2/all (PTO argues that it rejects a large number of patent
applications on the doctrine of written description alone even though the Federal Circuit
rarely sees such cases).
82 For example, the 2001 Utility Examination Guidelines were highly controversial,
but the Federal Circuit did not rule on their legitimacy until September 2005. In re Fisher,
421 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
83 See BuRK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 109.
84 Id.
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innovative policy expertise. 85 This view of the PTO, however, largely
ignores the reality that the Agency already does a fair amount of rulemaking
in the form of substantive guidance to examiners and patent applicants. It is
thus time to think more carefully about using the PTO to handle certain
issues, 86 or at least learn from the Agency's experiences.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the fact that the PTO is playing an
important role in shaping the contours of substantive law also necessitates an
exploration of how the Agency's institutional biases can affect the
development of substantive patent law. While the PTO's stance on
substantive law issues is undoubtedly guided by its mission of fostering
innovation and competition by providing high quality examination of patent
applications,87 like many agencies (and individuals), the PTO is also self-
interested in ways that may conflict with its public interest mission. The
remainder of this Part identifies two institutional features of the PTO, each of
which, when coupled with the PTO's natural self-interestedness, bias the
PTO's views on substantive law in a patent-protective direction. This Part
refers to these institutional features-unidirectional review of PTO decisions
by the Federal Circuit and the PTO's fee structure-as asymmetric because
they generally push the PTO's views on substantive patent law in an
expansive direction.
A. Asymmetric Review
This subpart explores how the asymmetric review of PTO determinations
is likely to distort the Agency's views of substantive patent law. In a recently
posted working paper, Jonathan Masur has explored a similar line of thought
and largely reaches the same conclusion regarding the effect of asymmetric
review on PTO decision making.88 While the current analysis concerns the
PTO, to some extent it also involves other administrative agencies. 89 In the
patent system, judicial review of PTO decisions is unidirectional-patent
denials are subject to immediate review by the Federal Circuit whereas patent
grants are not. In at least a subset of other administrative agency decisions,
85 Id. at 168 (describing the PTO as having "virtually no policy staff").
86 See, e.g., Michael Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=- 1718695 (arguing that the PTO
should be given substantive rulemaking authority).
87 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 38, at 8.
88 See Masur, supra note 17.
89 There are at least two other agencies that have formal asymmetries: the Social
Security Administration for Supplemental Security Income or Social Security Disability
Insurance, see 42 U.S.C. § 405 (2006), and decisions by the Board of Immigration
Appeals for removal and asylum, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2006).
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factors such as unequal stakes in the litigation or unequal finances to fund
litigation may also cause parties on one side of an agency decision to appeal
more frequently. 90 Asymmetric rates of appeal can create substantial
asymmetry in the judicial review of determinations, although the magnitude
of the asymmetry will be less than the PTO's.
The PTO, like many other decision makers, is concerned with both the
possibility of appeal and reversal of its determinations. 91 Appeals of PTO
decisions are costly to the Agency, as the PTO must defend its actions in
court. The PTO operates on a fixed budget and thus resources that it devotes
to litigation are resources that it necessarily cannot devote to more pressing
needs-such as updating the Agency's outdated technology system.92
Appeals of PTO decisions are also costly to the Agency because it risks
reversal. If the PTO is repeatedly overturned by the Federal Circuit, other
patentees may challenge the Agency's rulings with greater frequency, thus
adding to the PTO's litigation costs. 93 Reversal by the Federal Circuit may
90 For example, if regulated entities are more likely to sue the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) than food safety groups, then USDA regulations are
more likely to be challenged as too stringent than as too lax. The asymmetric appeal rates
can create an informal asymmetry in the judicial review of USDA decision making.
91 Scholars have long posited that for the most part, judges are concerned with their
records and detest having their determinations be overturned. See Delaware v. Van
Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 686 (1986) (White, J., concurring) ("No judge welcomes or can
ignore being told that he committed a constitutional violation, even if the conviction is
saved by a harmless-error finding."); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF
JURISPRUDENCE 224 (1990) ("[M]ost judges are highly sensitive to being reversed .... ");
Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior
Court Decisionmaking, 73 TEx. L. REV. 1, 77-78 (1994) (discussing reasons why district
court judges dislike being reversed on appeal).
92 Diane Bartz, Ex-IBMExec Tries to Reboot U.S. Patent Office, REUTERS (Jan. 26,
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/26/us-usa-budget-patents-
idUSTRE60P66220100126 ("An antiquated computer system which crashes and idles
thousands of workers is 'frankly embarrassing' says U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
Director David Kappos, a former International Business Machines executive who
estimates it would take several hundred million dollars to upgrade.").
93 Consider the experience of the Social Security Administration (SSA). During the
mid- 1 980s, the reversal rate of SSA decisions in federal district court soared to near 50%.
The constituencies of the SSA took notice, and the number of appeals filed in federal
court tripled from the early 1980s to the mid-1980s. See A. Leo Levin & Michael E.
Kunz, Thinking About Judgeships, 44 AM. U. L. REv. 1627, 1650 (1995) (stating that
litigants were encouraged by the high reversal rate to pursue appeals of Social Security
Administration decisions). By the early 1990s the reversal rate of the SSA in federal
court decreased to near 20% and so too had the number of appeals filed in federal court.
See Paul R. Verkuil, Reflections Upon the Federal Administrative Judiciary, 39 UCLA L.
REv. 1341, 1355 n.57, 1356 n.61 (1992).
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also cause reputational harm. 94 Repeat players, such as the PTO, believe their
reputation is largely their stock in trade.95 However, routine reversal by the
94 The PTO may also be concerned that its reputation before Congress would suffer
if its status as a fair arbitrator is called into question. While the PTO is a fee-funded
agency, Congress must still approve the PTO's budget every year. The PTO lacks
substantial fee-setting capabilities and is therefore beholden to Congress for fee increases.
Further, the PTO has expressed interest in obtaining substantive rulemaking-a change
that, at this point, could only occur through congressional action. Letter from Gary
Locke, Sec'y of Commerce, to Patrick J. Leahy & Jefferson B. Sessions, U.S. Senators
(Oct. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/letters/111/S515Oct0509.pdf ("Current law limits the
USPTO Director's ability to implement needed reforms through the promulgation of
administrative regulations.... Substantive rulemaking authority would remove doubt
raised regarding the USPTO Director's authority to adopt rules in light of Tafas v. Dudas,
541 F. Supp. 2d 805, 814 (E.D. Va. 2008); affd in part, rev'd in part, Tafas v. Doll, 559
F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. March 20, 2009); vacated, petition for rehearing en banc granted
(Fed. Cir. July 6, 2009). Furthermore, substantive rulemaking authority would give the
USPTO Director the ability to provide flexibility in the administration of patent rules and
procedures.").
95 Scholars have long recognized that repeat players are more concerned with their
credibility before a court than so-called one-shot players. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 95, 98-99 (1974); Hon. Fred I. Parker, Appellate Advocacy and Practice in
the Second Circuit, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 457, 462 (1998). Concerns with maintaining
institutional credibility before the Federal Circuit can be seen in the decision making
process of the PTO. Specifically, this concern has manifested itself with respect to the
PTO's decisions regarding whether to seek certiorari review of Federal Circuit decisions.
Routinely challenging the validity of Federal Circuit opinions is risky for the PTO. The
Federal Circuit, whose jurisdiction rarely overlaps with the jurisdiction of other appellate
courts, is somewhat isolated from inter-circuit debate regarding issues. Several scholars
posited that this isolation has caused the Federal Circuit to be less comfortable with
criticism than other circuits. See Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting, supra note 33, at 1570
(discussing how Federal Circuit judges have developed "thin skins"); Craig Allen Nard,
Toward a Cautious Approach to Obeisance: The Role of Scholarship in Federal Circuit
Patent Law Jurisprudence, 39 HOuS. L. REV. 667, 673-74 (2002) (finding that the
Federal Circuit is less likely to cite academic literature than other circuits).
Since the inception of the Federal Circuit in 1982, the PTO has never sought
certiorari review of a Federal Circuit decision on a patent law issue. The sole case in
which the Agency did seek Supreme Court review of a Federal Circuit decision,
Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150 (1999), involved the applicability of the Administrative
Procedure Act. This lack of review has occurred despite growing criticism of the state of
patent law jurisprudence since the late 1990s, see, e.g., NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, A
PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 81-83 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004);
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC
RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION, AND PUBLIC HEALTH 11-15
(Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza eds., 2006) (suggesting that the standard for
nonobviousness is too low, that the utility requirement is under-enforced, that doctrinal
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Federal Circuit may undermine the Agency's credibility before the court,
mitigating some of the PTO's repeat player advantage. 96
Assuming that the PTO is incentivized to minimize Federal Circuit
scrutiny and reversal of its decision making, it is reasonable to ask how this
incentive will affect its decision making. Most administrative agencies (and
judges) always bear some risk of reversal because their decisions are
potentially appealable by the aggrieved party-i.e., constituencies that are on
either side of an issue. In such cases, the decision makers' natural interest in
avoiding reversal, coupled with the possibility of appeal by either of the two
sets of constituents, will be neither frustrated nor furthered by systematically
favoring one side over the other. Such two-sided review thus frees an agency
to attempt to arrive at an answer that is dominated by considerations of the
public interest as well as the legal precedent.
In contrast, the unidirectional review of PTO decisions means the
Agency can avoid any risk of reversal and any costs associated with
immediate review of its decision making by granting a patent. In a system
where there is no immediate appeal of patent grants97 but there is the
possibility for immediate judicial review of patent denials, 98 the PTO could
changes have inhibited follow-on invention, and that subjective elements in patent
doctrine increase costs and discourage inventors from conducting library research), and
rumors that the PTO was unhappy with several Federal Circuit decisions, see, e.g.,
Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting, supra note 33, at 1570 (discussing the fact that
although the PTO was rumored to be unhappy with a Federal Circuit decision, the PTO
did not seek further review). This dearth of filings of certiorari petitions by the PTO
stands in contrast to the two decades prior to the creation of the Federal Circuit. In this
time period the PTO sought certiorari in more than a half-dozen cases. Nard & Duffy,
supra note 7, at 1641 n.79. This decrease in certiorari filings is consistent with an agency
that is concerned with maintaining its institutional credibility before a court.
96 Courts tend to be more critical of decision makers with poor reputations than
decision makers with outstanding reputations. See Robert E. Hawkins & David M.
Shoemaker, Reputational Review II. Administrative Agencies, Print Media & Content
Analysis, 12 CAN. J. ADMIN. L. & PRAc. 1 (1998) (arguing that judicial review of agency
decisions has morphed from focusing on the legality of the decision to the reputation of
the decision maker); Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review
Standards, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 707-08 (2002) (arguing that the reversal rate of
SSA is significantly higher than the substantial evidence scope of review would predict
and this high rate of reversal stems, in part, from "entrenched judicial skepticism" about
the "fairness and accuracy" of the SSA's decision making process).
97 A patent is issued on an invention that is new, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006), novel, id.
§ 102, non-obvious, id. § 103, constitutes patentable subject matter, id. § 101, is
adequately described, id. § 112, and enabled, id. § 112.
98 See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006) (outlining when a party may seek a Board appeal); id.
§ 141 (permitting appeals of Board decisions to the Federal Circuit). An applicant can
also undertake civil action in the District Court for the District of Columbia. Any appeals
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completely avoid litigation and any possibility of reversal by interpreting and
developing substantive law so that every invention meets the patentability
standards. There are, of course, many reasons why the PTO would not take
such a drastic measure, including the Agency's mission for promoting
"industrial and technological progress in the United States and
strengthen[ing] the national economy." 99
The PTO's desire to avoid scrutiny of its decision making and risk of
reversal can, nonetheless, have profound effects on the development of
substantive patent law. When the Agency is faced with a close legal issue,
high level officials will develop rules or patent policy that allow for the
patentability of these inventions. In other words, the PTO interprets and
develops substantive patent law so that it grants patents when it believes the
patent application would either just meet or just not meet the patentability
standards. Thus, PTO examiners will be instructed to utilize patentability
standards through either guidance documents or BPAI decisions that are
biased in the patent-protective direction.100 In this way the Agency is able to
ensure that the majority of patents it denies are likely to be upheld by the
Federal Circuit.101
Finally, it should be noted that even though the PTO can avoid direct
appeal by granting patents, its decisions can still be challenged in a
subsequent patent infringement suit or declaratory judgment action. As a
result, it is possible that the threat of this subsequent judicial review may
discipline the PTO and mitigate the expansionary bias described above.
Yet, from the PTO's perspective, patent grants and patent denials are not
fungible. There are a number of reasons why the PTO would prefer that a
granted patent be invalidated rather than a patent denial be reversed. First,
from the District Court for the District of Columbia involving patent denials can then be
appealed to the Federal Circuit. 35 U.S.C. § 145 (2006) (permitting appeals of Board
decisions to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia). In 2008, 25% of patent
applicants sought review by the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, whereas
75% appealed directly to the Federal Circuit. In 2007, 30% of patent applicants chose
civil action before the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and 70% appealed
directly to the Federal Circuit. Appealing the Board decision is not the only option for a
patent applicant. An applicant whose application has received a "final rejection" by the
examiner may choose to start the prosecution process over by filing a continuation
application or a request for continued examination. 35 U.S.C. § 120 (2006).
99 Patent and Trademark Mission, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/mission.html. This mission is likely to prevent the
Agency from ever advocating that its examiners grant all patents.
100 Biased in the sense that if the PTO only took into account its mission statement it
would arrive at a non-biased standard.
101 This analysis assumes that the Federal Circuit will also only take into account the
public interest and hence believes the non-biased standard is the correct result.
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the PTO is almost never a party when a granted patent is litigated, and hence
the Agency is not responsible for the litigation costs associated with
defending a patent grant. Second, high-level officials of the PTO are more
likely to be concerned about the PTO's present reputation than its future
reputation. The average time delay between the issuance of a patent and the
final validity decision, which is 8.6 years, 10 2 is greater than the average
tenure of PTO directors (as well as the vast majority of patent examiners). 103
Finally, there are at least three reasons why the reversal of a patent
denial is more likely to reflect poor decision making by the PTO and hence
possible reputational harm to the Agency, than the invalidation of a granted
patent. First, a court may decide that a granted patent is invalid on an issue
that was never before the PTO. In contrast, when a patent applicant appeals a
patent denial, she is precluded from presenting new issues absent some
compelling reason that the issue was not presented before the PTO.10 4
Second, even when a court decides the validity of a granted patent on an
issue the PTO has considered, the court is likely to have the luxury of
considering more evidence (i.e., new prior art) than the PTO. 10 5 Third, the
law may have changed from when the PTO issued the patent to when the
court invalidated the patent. 10 6 Thus, it seems unlikely that the threat of
subsequent judicial review of patent grants will have any mitigating effect on
the PTO's expansionary bias described above.
102 Allison & Lemley, supra note 12, at 236 tbl.12. For a quarter of all patents
reaching final judgment in a district court action, more than eleven years elapse. U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT REFORM: UNLEASHING INNOVATION, PROMOTING
ECONOMIC GROWTH & PRODUCING HIGH-PAYING JOBS 8 (2010), available at
http://www.commerce.gov/s/groups/public/@doc/@os/@opa/documents/content/prodO 1
009147.pdf.
103 As the Director of the PTO is nominated by the President and approved by the
Senate, 35 U.S.C. § 3 (2006), the leadership of the PTO changes as the Administration in
the White House changes.
104 See DeSeversky v. Brenner, 424 F.2d 857, 858-59, (D.C. Cir. 1970) (affirming
dismissal of patent applicant's § 145 action seeking to set aside an obviousness rejection
where the applicant failed to show that the PTO had erred in originally rejecting the claim
and the new testimony it presented to show nonobviousness focused on the presence of a
structural feature that the applicant had not presented to the PTO).
105 Allison & Lemley, supra note 12, at 208 tbl.1 (42% obviousness and 27%
novelty prior art).
106 Consider, for example, means-plus-function claims of computer software
patents. Harris Corp. v. Ericsson, Inc., 417 F.3d 1241, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2005); WMS




While the unidirectional review of PTO determinations gives rise to a
protective patent bias in the PTO's views on substantive patent law, in
general, so too do the PTO's financial incentives. The PTO is a self-funded
agency that obtains its entire budget through user fees. 107 Several scholars
have suggested that the fact that the Agency is user fee funded may lead it to
make decisions that favor its constituency at the expense of the public. 10 8 At
least one scholar, Arti Rai, has noted that the specific fee structure of the
PTO creates a financial incentive for the PTO to grant patents, although her
limited treatment of the issue did not fully examine the distortions caused by
the specific fee structure of the Agency or the interplay between these
distortions and the Agency's nontrivial role in substantive law
development. 109 This Part moves beyond these more preliminary discussions
and argues that fee structure of the PTO does not merely result in examiners
randomly issuing invalid patents. More profoundly, because the PTO is
actually designing and influencing patent policies, the Agency's financial
incentives to grant patents can have a strong and direct effect on the content
of substantive patent law.
The PTO gamers over 80% of its patent operating budget" 0 through
three types of fees: a filing, search, and examination fee (collectively referred
107 The PTO budget is set to the amount of projected revenue it will collect through
user fees. The PTO has been funded by user fees since 1990. Omnibus Reconciliation Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 10101, 104 Stat. 1388, 1388-91 (1990).
108 See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 16, at 314 ("[PTO] is favorably disposed to
patent holders ... [in part because] the agency as a whole is funded by applicant fees.");
Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 579 n.178 (2009) ("A pro-
patent bias also arises because the PTO is wholly funded by patent-applicant fees.");
Long, supra note 19, at 1994 ("[T]he PTO's budgetary structure creates a bias in favor of
granting patents and encouraging inventors to apply for patents. It also creates the
incentive for the PTO to favor patentees (who pay fees to the PTO) over nonpatentees
(who do not)."); Meurer, supra note 36, at 699 ("The PTO has endorsed a 'customer
service' orientation that stresses the importance of meeting the needs of patent applicants.
This orientation may be motivated in part by the dependence of the [A]gency on fees to
fund its operation.").
109 Arti K. Rai, Growing Pains in the Administrative State: The Patent Office's
Troubled Quest for Managerial Control, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 2051, 2062 (2009) ( "[T]he
current fee structure also sets up an obvious financial incentive for the PTO to grant
patents.").
10 The patent operating budget accounts for close to 90% of the PTO's total
operating budget. See PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 38, at
46-49 (noting that the PTO's total earned revenue in the fiscal year of 2009 was $1.927
billion, of which approximately 90% was earned through patent revenues while the
remaining 10% was earned through trademark revenues).
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to as examination fees), which is paid when a patent application is filed; an
issuance fee, which is paid when a patent issues; and maintenance fees or
renewal fees, which are paid periodically on granted patents so that they
remain enforceable. 1 1 While examination fees account for approximately
30% of the PTO budget, these fees do not cover the actual cost incurred by
the PTO to perform these services. 112 Consider, for example, that in the fiscal
year 2009 the PTO estimated that the average cost of examining a patent
application was approximately $3,500.113 The examination fees are only
$1,090 for large for-profit corporations and half that amount for individuals,
small firms, non-profit corporations, or other enterprises that qualify for
"small entity" status. 114 Therefore, the paid examination fees cover less than
one-third of the actual examination costs for large corporations and less than
one-sixth of actual costs for small entities.
The PTO is dependent on issuance fees and maintenance fees, which
account for almost 50% of the PTO's patent operating budget, to subsidize
the cost of the Agency's examination process. In its 2009 fiscal year, the
issuance fee was set at $1,510,115 and the maintenance fees, which are due at
three-and-a-half, seven-and-a-half, and eleven-and-a-half years, were $980,
$2,480, and $4,110, respectively. 116 Again, these amounts are halved for
small entities. Unlike the examination process, the costs to the Agency of
issuing and maintaining a patent are virtually negligible. Fees paid for these
services are almost pure profit for the Agency. Furthermore, once a patent is
granted, the PTO's involvement with that patent usually ends. 117 In other
111 Id. at 49 (stating that approximately 80% of total patent income comes from
maintenance fees, initial application for filing, search, and examination and issue fees).
112 Id. (stating that 31.3% of total patent income comes from filing, search, and
examination fees).
113 Id. at 37 (stating that in 2009, the average patent cost $3,523 to examine).
114 37 C.F.R. § 1.16(a)(1) (2010) (basic filing fee is $330 and $165 for small entity);
id. § 1.16(k) (utility search fee is normally $540 and $270 for small entity); id § 1.16(o)
(utility examination fee is normally $220 and $110 for small entity). An entity is defined
by the PTO as individuals, nonprofit organizations, or business entities that qualify as
small businesses under the Small Business Act. Id. § 1.27(a)(1)-(3).
115 37 C.F.R. § 1.18(a) (2010).
l161d. § 1.20(e-g).
117 The sole exceptions are ex parte and inter partes reexamination. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 303 (2006). These two procedures provide a limited administrative procedure for
reviewing granted patents. Both of these procedures suffer from having narrow
substantive grounds for review and strict estoppel provisions. Ex parte reexamination
bars the participation of a third party once the PTO has determined whether a
reexamination should commence. 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) ("The active participation of the
ex parte reexamination requester ends with the reply pursuant to § 1.535, and no further
submissions on behalf of the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or
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words, the Agency does not usually have to allocate any additional resources
to a patent once it has been granted. The result is that the majority of the
PTO's budget is gained through fees that the Agency only collects if a patent
is granted.1 18 This fact, along with the cross-subsidization of the examination
process by issuance and maintenance fees, sets up an obvious financial
incentive for the PTO to grant, rather than deny, patents.
Yet, denying a patent will likely cost the PTO more than just the missed
opportunity of obtaining post-allowance fees. When a patent application is
denied, the applicant can choose one of three options. First, the patent
applicant can abandon the application, in which case the PTO loses the
differential between the cost of examining the patent and the examination
fees. Second, the patent applicant can choose to appeal the denial to the
BPAI and seek review of a BPAI denial in federal court. 1 9 If the patent
applicant seeks federal review, the PTO must utilize its own legal office to
defend its actions in court. 120 Third, an applicant can elect to "restart" the
patent examination process by filing a request for continued examination
(RCE) or by filing a continuation application. 121 By filing such a request, a
considered."). Inter partes reexamination allows for third-party participation but in a
limited manner-the third party has the right to file written comments addressing "issues
raised by the Office action or the patent owner's response." Id. § 1.947. These problems
have had a dramatic effect on the number of reexaminations requests. For example, in
2009, only 258 inter partes reexaminations were filed while over 165,000 utility patents
issued. PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 38, at 116 tbl.6, 124
tbl. 13.
118 Of course, there may be good innovation policy reasons to have maintenance
fees that are substantial and escalate over time. See, e.g., Francesca Comelli & Mark
Schankerman, Patent Renewals and R&D Incentives, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 197 (1999)
(demonstrating that under certain circumstances the socially optimal patent system
involves increasing renewal fees); Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Optimality of the Patent
Renewal System, 30 RAND J. OF ECON. 181 (1999) (same).
119 See 35 U.S.C. § 134 (2006) (outlining when a party may seek a Board appeal);
id§ 141 (permitting appeals of Board decisions to the Federal Circuit); id. § 145
(permitting appeals of Board decisions to the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia).
120 A patent applicant must pay a notice of appeal fee of $540, 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.20(b)(1) (2010), a fee to file a brief in support of an appeal of $540, id.
§ 41.20(b)(2), and a fee to request for oral hearing of $1080, id. § 41.20(b)(3). It is not
clear how much the PTO spends on a BPAI hearing. However, even if these fees cover
the PTO's costs, it seems unlikely that a surplus would offset the revenue that the PTO
loses by defending actions before federal courts.
121 A patent applicant who files a continuation application files an entirely new
application, although the new application can share the same filing date as the "parent."
In contrast, a patent applicant who files an RCE is requesting continued prosecution of
the existing application. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent
2011]
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
"finally rejected" patent application receives continued examination by the
PTO. I22 The fees for examining an RCE are set below the examining fees for
a new application and the fees for examining a continuation application are
the same as a new application.1 23 While the costs to the PTO of continued
examination are probably less than the original examination, the savings are
unlikely to reach the amount required to align fees with costs. There is a high
likelihood that at least some of the potential cost savings of continued
examination (i.e., the examiner does not have to reread the patent application
or reread the pertinent prior art) are unlikely to be realized because of high
examiner turnover. 124 Thus, the mismatch in examination fees and
examination costs for a patent application are likely to increase with each
iteration through the examination system. These additional costs of denying a
patent reinforce the incentive to grant, rather than deny, patents that is
inherent in the fee structure of the PTO.
It would be difficult to empirically test the extent to which the financial
incentive to grant patents influences the PTO's views of substantive patent
law. Nonetheless, there are reasons to believe that this incentive impacts the
decisional process of the Agency. Budgets are undeniably important to
agencies. Scholars have posited that agency leaders seek to maximize their
budgets or profit because these entities are positively correlated with other
goods that a bureaucrat values, such as compensation, prestige and prospects
for advancement, and the ability of the agency to carry out its mission. 125
While the universal nature of the budget- or profit- maximizing bureaucrat
Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 63, 68 n.14 (2004). The use of these practices is fairly
widespread. It has been estimated that approximately a quarter of all patents granted
result from the use of continuation. See id. at 69. Also, continuations have a longer
history than RCE, the latter of which have only existed since 1999. See American
Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, sec. 4403(2), § 132(b), 113 Stat.
1501A-552, 1501A-560 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 132(b) (2006)) (establishing
RCEs).
122 See Lemley & Moore, supra note 121, at 64 ("One of the oddest things about the
United States patent system is that it is impossible for the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office ('PTO') to ever finally reject a patent application.").
123 In its 2009 fiscal year, the request for continued examination fee was $810 for a
large entity and $405 for a small entity. 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(e) (2010).
124 U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE:
HIRING EFFORTS ARE NOT SUFFICIENT To REDUCE THE PATENT APPLICATION BACKLOG
13 (2007), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d071l02.pdf (discussing high
patent examiner attrition rates).
125 See generally THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISAL AND
EVIDENCE (Andr6 Blais & Strphane Dion eds., 1991); WILLIAM A. NIsKANEN, JR.,




has been questioned, 126 it seems that even a benevolent agency-an agency
that merely strives to perform its mission and not maximize its budget or
profit-will seek increased funding if its current budget falls short of the
amount required for the agency to perform its expected duties. There is
widespread agreement that the present budget of the PTO is insufficient for
the Agency to carry out its expected responsibilities. 127 The Agency has a
backlog of 735,000 patent applications awaiting initial review and a growing
wait time before the Agency acts on a filed patent application. Therefore,
even if the PTO does not have an imperialistic motive of profit
maximization, it seems likely that it will seek to increase its budget so that it
can meet its expected output or responsibilities.
Given that the PTO is looking to augment its budget, 128 how then will
this incentive affect the PTO's views on substantive law? The PTO will
1 2 6 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 182 (1989) ("The view that all bureaus want larger budgets ignores the
fact that there is often a tradeoff between bigger budgets on the one hand and the
complexity of tasks, the number of rivals, and the multiplicity of constraints on the
other."); Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARv. L. REV. 915, 917-20 (2005) (arguing that empire-building of agencies is overstated
because bureaucrats do not have the same motives as corporate leaders).
127 FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 8, at 10 ("Hearings participants unanimously
held the view that the PTO does not receive sufficient funding for its responsibilities.").
128 The PTO lacks fee-setting authority and thus needs to lobby Congress for any
budget increase. Currently, any significant change in the filing fees, issuance fees, and
maintenance fees requires congressional action. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(d) (2006) (limiting
the PTO's discretion in setting fees to minor issues such as "processing, services, or
materials"). The PTO has enjoyed limited success in convincing Congress to increase its
budget. For example, the PTO was able to end the controversial practice known as "fee-
diversion." Long, supra note 19, at 1986-87. However, support from the users of the
patent system has been more mixed with respect to the PTO's proposals to increase its
fees. Campaigns in 1990 and 1991 to end small entity status and a 2002 campaign to
increase fee levels and restructure fees were largely unsuccessful because patent
applicants did not support these increases. See Traci Watson, Patent Office Drops Plan to
Raise Fees, 356 NATURE 645, 645 (1992) (noting that after "failing twice to convince
Congress that small-scale inventors do not deserve a price break, the US Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) has dropped its opposition to such a discount" and that "small
inventors convinced Congress that a higher maintenance fees [sic] would weaken the US
economy"). The PTO is currently seeking the ability to set its own fees, in part to better
align fees with costs, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2011
PRESIDENT'S BUDGET 2, 8 (2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/budget/fyllpbr.pdf, but patent owners do not
appear to support this initiative, see, e.g., U.S. Patent Reform Primer, No. 4 Senate Bill
Shifts Authority to Set Patent and Trademark Fees, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OWNERS
Ass'N (Jan. 9, 2011, 9:35 AM),
http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.c fm?Section=IPODaily__News_&CONTENTID=243
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generally interpret and develop substantive law in an expansive manner in an
effort to grant more patents. The PTO could maximize its budget by granting
every patent. However, such a drastic practice is unlikely, as the PTO is
motivated by other concerns than just the size of its budget. Similar to
asymmetric review, asymmetric funding of the Agency is most likely to
manifest in the marginal or close cases. Thus, the PTO will adopt
expansionary positions with respect to patent law in order that close legal
issues are decided in favor of the patentee.
Although the PTO's basic fee structure preferences patent grants over
denials, not all patent grants generate equal revenue for the PTO. If a higher
percentage of patents in technology X are maintained than in technology Y,
then, on average, an issued patent in technology X will generate more
revenue than issued patents in technology Y. Thus, if the PTO seeks to
maximize its potential income by granting more patents, the PTO has an
incentive to grant more patents in technology fields with the highest chance
of patent renewal. Kimberly Moore-now Judge Moore on the Federal
Circuit-found that renewal rates vary greatly across technology fields.
Specifically, she found that patents on semiconductors and electrical devices,
communications, and computer technology are more likely to be maintained
than mechanical patents and that mechanical patents are more likely to be
maintained than biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents. 1
29
05&TEMPLATE=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm#4 ("IPO for many years has opposed shifting
fee-setting authority to the USPTO.").
129 Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521, 1540
(2005). The amount of revenue, on average, the PTO will collect per patent issued also
depends on whether the patent owner is a small entity, as small entities pay half the
renewal fees of other patent owners. At the time of filing, renewal rates and the
percentage of small entity filers in a technology field are generally negatively correlated.
For example, biotechnology and pharmaceutical patents are less likely to be renewed
once granted but also more likely of being filed by patent applicants claiming small entity
status (36% of patent applications are filed by small entity filers). In contrast, patents
granted in semiconductors and computer technology fields are more likely to be renewed
but are less likely of being filed by a patent applicant claiming small entity status (17%
and 16% respectively). Thus, at least based on characteristics of the patent applicants at
the time of filing, the PTO stands to collect less revenue for a patent issued in the
biotechnology and pharmaceutical field not only because the patent is less likely to be
renewed but also because when the patent owner does renew the patent, it is more likely
to pay half the fees. E-mail from David Wiley, Acting Dir., Office of Planning and
Budget, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to author (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:50 PM) (on file
with author) (providing data on the percentage of small entity filers by technology field
for the fiscal years of 2005-2010). However, the data regarding small entities is only at
the time of filing and does not take into account whether the patent has been transferred
to a large entity after it was issued. While it is unclear how frequently patents are
transferred, litigated patents that were originally issued to individuals have a very high
[Vol. 72:2
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The likelihood of maintenance is generally consistent with the PTO's
most recent granting patterns.' 30 Semiconductors and electrical device
patents are the most likely to be granted-nearly 80% of patent applications
in this technology field issue. 131 Communications and computer technology
also have high grant rates of 68% and 65%, respectively. 132 In contrast, only
57% of mechanical patent applications and 45% of biotechnology and
pharmaceutical patent applications issue. 133  From a social welfare
perspective, this field-specific incentive to grant patents is troubling, as
patents on computer technology and software, a technological field with one
of the highest renewal rates, are generally believed to be some of the least
socially valuable.134
transfer rate. See Hon. Kimberly A. Moore, Populism and Patents, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
69, 96-97 (2007) (finding that 39.7% of litigated patents were transferred and that 42.3%
of patents that corporations litigated were acquired after issuance and that almost all of
these were originally issued to individuals).
130 These technology fields are broad and inevitably include some heterogeneity in
grant rates across subdivisions. See Dennis Crouch, USPTO Grant Rate by Technology
Center, PATENTLY-O (May 27, 2010, 2:24 AM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/05/uspto-grant-rate-by-technology-center.html;
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE: PATENT TECHNOLOGY CENTERS,
http://www.uspto.gov/about/contacts/phone directory/pat tech/ (last visited Jan. 29,
2011) (technology centers listed by code). But see Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is
the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 182 (2008) (finding that the PTO
grants a lower percentage of patents for computer architecture, software, and information
security patents and a higher percentage of patents for biotechnology and
pharmaceuticals). The Lemley and Sampat sample included every utility patent
application filed in January 2001 and published in April 2006, which consisted of
approximately 10,000 patent applications. Id. at 187.
131 Crouch, supra note 130.
132 Id. This data set includes 25,000 utility patent applications from the past few
years.
133 Id.
134 Surveys of software firms have consistently reported that patents do not provide
strong protection of their inventions and serve as weak incentives to innovate. Richard C.
Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3
BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783, 793-99 (1987) (surveying R&D managers
about the efficacy of patents and finding that respondents rated patents as the least
effective method of appropriation and preferred other devices to protect returns on
investments); Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software
Industry?, 83 TEx. L. REV. 961, 997-98 (2005) (same). Recent empirical work of James
Bessen and Michael Meurer finds that communications and computer technology patents
are likely to provide a net disincentive for innovation because the risk of patent litigation
for public software firms surpasses the profits derived from these patents. JAMES BESSEN
& MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS
PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 144 (2008).
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Of course, without information about the underlying quality of patent
applications, grant rates tell us little about either the quality of patents the
PTO is issuing or the "correctness" of the patentability standards that
examiners are using. Nonetheless, the extent to which the PTO is looking to
augment its budget by taking an expansive view on substantive patent law is
likely to manifest in an industry-specific manner.1 35 As Dan Burk and Mark
Lemley have persuasively argued, patent doctrine is not transsubstantive as it
may first appear, but instead is industry-specific and largely shaped by the
disciplines to which it is applied. 136 The PTO would develop its views on
patent law so that examiners are generally instructed to follow patentability
standards that are more expansive than non-biased standards (the standards
influenced by only the public interest) in an effort to grant more patents. Yet,
as the above analysis suggests, the magnitude of the bias would be greatest in
technological fields where the PTO stands to financially benefit the most
from granting patents-such as semiconductors and electrical devices,
communications and computer technology-and the smallest in sectors
135 The PTO is likely to be influenced by not only the revenue it collects per average
patent granted in a technology field but also the average cost to the PTO to examine a
patent application within that technology field. For example, if the average
semiconductor patent cost the PTO $100,000 to examine, then the agency would have
little financial incentive to grant more patents in this field because even with high
renewal rates, the PTO would fail to collect enough revenue to cover its costs of
examination. It is, however, difficult to estimate the average cost to the Agency to
examine a patent application as a function of technology. There are a number of factors
that will contribute to the expenses the Agency incurs when examining a patent,
including the percentage of applications that are continuations and the complexity of the
technological field. The former suggests that both semiconductor and computer
technology patent applications are less expensive for the PTO to examine than
biotechnology and pharmaceutical patent applications. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly
A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 86 tbl.2 (2004)
(finding that the frequency of continuation practice varies across technological fields with
a high percentage (43%) of continuations filed in the biotechnology field and lower
percentages (25% and 18%, respectively) of continuations filed in computer technology
and semiconductor technology). The complexity of the technology also plays an
important role in contributing to the costs the Agency must bear in examining patent
applications. While the hours an examiner is given to evaluate a patent application varies
depending on the complexity level of the art-the most complex areas are allotted 31.6
hours per application whereas the least complex areas are allotted 13.8 hours per
application-the PTO has not fully disclosed these hour requirements. E-mail from David
Wiley, Acting Dir., Office of Planning & Budget, U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, to
author (Sept. 23, 2010, 2:50 PM) (on file with author).
136 BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 169-70. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark
A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002);
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REv. 1575
(2003).
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where the PTO stands to financially benefit the least from granting patents-
such as biotechnology or pharmaceuticals. 137
C. Administrative Concerns
This subpart explores whether the PTO's tendency to develop and
interpret substantive patent law in an expansive manner is tempered or even
entirely counteracted by administrability concerns. The PTO may take a
more restrictive stance on substantive standards for at least two reasons
related to administrative issues. First, the PTO may resist extending patent
rights to an emerging field of technology because the Agency lacks either a
staff with significant knowledge in this technology or the resources necessary
to review patent applications in this emerging field.' 38 Second, the PTO may
interpret and develop the law in a restrictive manner in hopes of decreasing
its backlog of 735,000 patent applications. 139 The backlog of patent
applications is a pressing issue to the Agency; the PTO may hope that taking
a restrictive stance on patentability standards will result in the filing of fewer
patent applications.
While the PTO's efforts to administer the patentability standards may
lead the PTO to take a more restrictive stance on substantive patent law
issues, the frequency is likely much smaller than it first appears. First, patent
applications within an emerging field usually begin to trickle into the PTO
over a few years. It is unusual for the Agency to see large jumps in the filing
of patent applications in an emerging field within a few years, even without a
137 It is possible that pharmaceutical patents are just financial losers to the PTO and
that the Agency actually takes too restrictive a stance on patentability standards in this
area in order to decrease patent filings in this field. This would be particularly
troublesome from a social welfare perspective, as patents on pharmaceuticals are
generally believed to incentivize investment in socially valuable innovation. See
Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 TEx. L.
REv. 503, 504 (2009) ("It is widely accepted that patents play an essential role in
motivating private investment in pharmaceutical R&D, and those investments have
yielded tremendous social gains through the resulting introduction of new drugs.").
138 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 218 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("No
doubt [the PTO] may have been motivated by a concern about the ability of the Patent
Office to process effectively the flood of applications that would inevitably flow from a
decision that computer programs are patentable.").
139 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT, supra note 38, at 114 tbl.3. See
U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, 2007-2012 STRATEGIC PLAN 1 (2007), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012.pdf (noting the
number one goal stated in the PTO's Strategic Plan includes optimizing patent
timeliness).
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court opinion that changes the default rules. 140 The large turnover rate of
examiners allows the PTO to continually infuse the Agency with examiners
fresh from the field. Much emerging technology builds on present day
scientific expertise or the further development of an existing field; thus the
PTO will usually already have some personnel with significant experience in
the field.141 Furthermore, not all restrictive stances on the law will result in
decreasing the number of patent applications that are filed and hence reduce
the PTO's backlog. Patent attorneys and patent applicants have become very
clever at crafting claim language to get around substantive patent law
restrictions. 142 Thus, if the PTO takes a restrictive stance on patentability
standards, it may result in a shift of the types of patent applications the PTO
receives but will not decrease the total number of applications.
Finally, there are a variety of policy levers, which the PTO can utilize,
that could conceivably decrease the PTO's backlog without exposing itself to
reversal by the Federal Circuit and the costs associated with defending its
actions in court. 143 To this end, the PTO has recently announced the "Patent
Application Backlog Reduction Stimulus Plan," under which an individual,
small firm, or other enterprise that qualifies as a "small entity" can choose to
abandon a previously filed application that has not been examined in
140 This assumes that the effort it takes the PTO to examine a patent application
corresponds with the number of applications filed. An exception to this rule is expressed
sequence tags (EST), or fragments of DNA. Although the PTO had only received about
100 large DNA patent applications up to 1996, they contained as many as 500,000 EST.
See Eliot Marshall, Patent Office Faces 90-Year Backlog, 272 ScIENCE 643, 643 (1996)
(PTO arguing that it would take the Agency close to a hundred years and 20 million
dollars to examine the pending patent applications). Thus, it was not too surprising that
the PTO took a restrictive stance, requiring that a patent applicant must know the
underlying gene function of the EST in order for the utility standard to be satisfied. In re
Fisher, 421 F.3d 1365, 1368-69 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
141 For example, the field of biotechnology has offered a host of interesting
patentability questions, including genes, expressed sequence tags, antibodies, and genetic
testing.
142 See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Bilski: Adding Obvious But Meaningful Limitations,
PATENTLY-O (Nov. 3, 2008, 11:46 AM), available at
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2008/ 1 /bilski-adding-o.html (noting that claim
drafting techniques can be used to satisfy restrictions in substantive law without
"sacrificing valuable claim scope").
143 While the PTO does not "tally the number of attorney hours devoted to any
single project," Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), a case where the PTO arguably
took a more restrictive stance on patentable subject matter was "certainly a whopper" in
terms of man power to defend in court. E-mail from Raymond Chen, Deputy General




exchange for the expedited review of another patent application. 144 Further,
the PTO is seeking comments on adopting deferred examination, where PTO
examiners would no longer automatically review every patent application
that is filed but instead would only review patent applications wherein the
applicants submitted a specific request for examination. Deferred
examination systems are employed in many patent-granting countries, 145 and
these jurisdictions have reported that a substantial number of patent
applicants have never requested substantive examination. 146
Yet even if we assume that the PTO's incentive to skew its views of
substantive patent law is offset by other institutional concerns such as patent
backlog, it remains imperative that we endeavor to understand any distortion
in the law caused by the unidirectional review of PTO decisions and the
financial pressures to grant patents. This is particularly important when the
offsetting biases are only temporary in nature. If and when the PTO
decreases its backlog, this potential counter-bias will be gone. The
asymmetric review of PTO determinations and financial incentives to grant
patents will, however, still remain, and hence it is likely that these biases will
win out over the long term.
IV. EXAMINER INCENTIVES AND PATENT LAW DEVELOPMENT
The previous Part identified two asymmetric incentives that are likely to
be internalized by high-level officials within the PTO-i.e., the officials that
are setting the Agency's views on substantive patent law-and explained
why these incentives exert an expansionary pressure on the PTO's views on
substantive law. Up until this point, this Article has argued high-level
officials articulate the Agency's patent protective standards through guidance
documents and BPAI decisions and that patent examiners readily follow the
Agency's views. However, high-level officials can influence the
144 See Perry E. Van Over, A New Pilot Program: Patent Application Backlog
Reduction Stimulus Plan, ORTHOPRENEUR, Mar.-Apr. 2010, 36, 36. As small entities pay
half the fees of other patent applicants, it is not surprising that the PTO targeted these
backlogged patent applications.
145 See Letter from Alan Hammond, Chief Intellectual Prop. Counsel, Life Techs.,
to the Honorable John J. Doll, Acting Dir. of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (Feb.
26, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/conmments/deferredcomments/lifetechco
rp.pdf (noting that all of the top ten trading partners of the United States, with the
exception of Mexico, currently employ deferred examination).
146 For example, the Japan Patent Office (JPO) currently operates under a three-year
period of deferral. In 2008, the JPO reported that only 65.6% of all applications
proceeded to examination. THlE TRILATERAL OFFICES, FOUR OFFICES STATISTICAL
REPORT 52 (2008), available at http://www.trilateral.net/statistics/tsr/statisticsreport.html.
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development of substantive patent law beyond instructing examiners to apply
the Agency's views on patent law. This Part explores how PTO officials may
use other channels, most likely in tandem with guidance documents and
BPAI decisions explored in Part II, to push substantive patent law standards
in a patent-protective direction. More specifically, this Part explores how the
PTO structures examiner incentives to exert expansionary pressure on
substantive patent law.
In general, there is widespread agreement that the incentive structure of
examiners is biased towards the allowance of patents. 147 For example, the
longstanding PTO policy requiring examiners to articulate the reasons for
rejecting patent claims but not for allowing patent claims means that
examiners often have to work harder to reject rather than to allow a patent
application.148 This one-sided workload may bias examiners towards
allowing patents, especially in close cases. Further, it is well recognized that
the examiner's compensation system also favors allowance. 149 Examiners are
147 There are also at least two other reasons why examiners may struggle to reject
invalid patents: the ex parte nature of the administrative process for obtaining a patent
and the fact that the burden of proof is on the examiner to show that a patent should not
issue. However, these reasons are less clearly in the control of high-level officials in the
Agency. Finally, it should be noted that the unidirectional review of examiner decisions
by the BPAI further buttresses any patent-protective views of the Agency. A patent
applicant can only seek court review of a patent denial after she has exhausted her
administrative remedies-when both the examiner and the BPAI have rejected the patent
application. Because the BPAI only reviews patent applications that have been denied by
an examiner, the BPAI can only correct erroneously denied patents. Therefore, BPAI
review affects the distribution of patent decisions in a one-way manner-it eliminates
some of the erroneously denied patents and concomitantly decreases the risk of PTO
reversal. See Benjamin & Rai, supra note 16, at 316-17 (arguing that the Federal Circuit
should be more deferential to PTO decision making with respect to patent denials than to
patent grants, in part because BPAI review of patent denials is likely to result in the
PTO's denying invalid patents).
148 See Lemley, supra note 76, at 1496 n.3 ("[E]xaminers must write up reasons for
rejection, but not reasons for allowance, giving them more incentives to allow rather than
reject an application."); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REv. 305, 324-25 (2001)
("Patent Office practice requires that examiners articulate their reasons for a rejection,
while most often examiners need say nothing if they chose to allow a case. The belief is
widely held that this regime encourages examiners to allow rather than to reject
applications.").
149 See, e.g., THOMAS H. STANTON ET AL., NAT'L ACAD. OF PUBLIC ADMIN., U.S.
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE: TRANSFORMING TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF THE 21ST
CENTURY 102 (2005) (noting that the productivity schedule is "highly biased toward
early allowances"); Long, supra note 19, at 1991 ("Internal PTO practices create a bias in
favor of granting patents."); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14
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rewarded by the number of patent applications they can dispose of, and the
fastest and easiest way to dispose of a patent application is to allow it. The
PTO's recent revision to the examiner compensation system reduces the
incentive to grant patents but does not eliminate it altogether.150 Both the
compensation system of examiners and PTO policy to require examiners to
provide written explanation for why they reject but not allow a case are
within the control of the Agency. However, PTO officials have never
proposed that examiners should also provide a written explanation for why a
patent is allowable, and the recent revision of the compensation system,
which provided a chance to completely recalibrate examiners incentives,
instead left in place a bias towards allowance. Thus, it is possible that the
asymmetric incentives discussed in Part III may also be manifesting in the
Agency's decision to continue structuring examiner incentives to favor patent
grants.
In addition to reinforcing the pro-patentee official views of the PTO,
examiner incentives can also set de facto official views of substantive patent
law in areas where examiners have not been provided with Agency guidance.
It is highly unlikely that an individual examiner's substantive rule will be
applied uniformly across patent applications-examiners simply lack the
ability to communicate with, and exert influence upon, a substantial number
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 607 (1999) ("Consequently, the only way to earn bonus points
with confidence is to allow a patent application."); Thomas, supra note 148, at 324-25.
150 Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Joint Labor-Management Task Force Proposes
Significant Changes to Examiner Count System (Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/09-19.htm. The old compensation
system gave examiners credits for only two actions: first action on the merits and
disposals. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, USPTO SHOULD
REASSESS How EXAMINER GOALS, PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL PLANS, AND THE AWARD
SYSTEM STIMULATE AND REWARD EXAMINER PRODUCTION 7-8 (2004). A first action on
the merits credit is earned when an examiner makes initial written communication to the
applicant as to the patentability of the claimed invention. Id. at 7 n.7. A disposal credit is
generally earned when an application is allowed or abandoned. Id. at 7 n.8. Absent from
the ways of earning a disposal credit is the continued rejection of an application or a new
rejection based on the applicant's response to the first office action on the merits.
STANTON ET AL., supra note 149, at 103.
The new metric of evaluation improves on the old system in several ways. First,
examiners earn credits for final rejections. Press Release, USPTO, USPTO Joint Labor
and Management Count System Task Force Proposal, Update to the Examining Corps
(Sept. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/documents/briefingfor 
_corps-
finaldraft-093009-external-jrb.pdf. Second, actions are now weighted-an examiner
now earns more credits for a first action on the merits and less for a disposal. Id. To the
extent that the old system skewed examiner incentives, the new system is an
improvement and should encourage more neutral decision making.
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of their counterparts. Because examiner incentives favor allowance,
individual examiners all facing the same close legal question may simply
grant the patent. In this way, examiners who have not been given guidance
from high-level officials may, acting individually, de facto set the PTO's
stance on a substantive law.
V. EXPANSIONARY PRESSURE ON THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
This Article has thus far focused almost exclusively on the PTO. The
previous Parts first showed that the PTO must develop its own views of
substantive patent law, and second, identified a bias that pushes the PTO's
views on substantive patent law in a patent-protective direction. The PTO's
tendency to expand the patentability standards, while of concern in its own
right, could conceivably be corrected by the Federal Circuit. In theory, the
appellate court could continually cut back on the PTO's expansive views of
patent law. Yet, this Part argues the Federal Circuit is unlikely to do so.
Specifically, this Part explores how the PTO's overly permissive views of
substantive patent law in turn create pressure for the Federal Circuit to
enunciate legal standards that, over time, also drift in the expansive direction.
To begin, overly expansive patentability standards can have negative
ramifications on consumers and innovators. While patents promote the
production of new inventions by giving inventors a monetary incentive to
devote resources to the creation and development of an invention, they do so
at a cost to consumers-higher prices and less access to the invention during
the duration of the patent. 151 If patents become too plentiful or if patent rules
become too strong, the costs of patents may cease to outweigh the benefits to
consumers.
Patents, however, also give rise to dynamic costs. While patents promote
innovation, they also limit the productive uses of the patented inventions,
such as the use of the invention for further improvement or the use of the
invention as inputs to future innovation. 152 Innovation is highly
151 See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 6 (1998); MERGES & DUFFY, supra note 13, at 253-56 (describing the
incentive systems meant to drive patent law); Michael Abramowicz, The Uneasy Case for
Patent Races Over Auctions, 60 STAN. L. REV. 803, 809-10 (2007) (assessing whether
patent auctions can be structured to benefit the social welfare).
152 See F. M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 450-53 (2d ed. 1980); S. SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, &
COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF
THE PATENT SYSTEM 21 (Comm. Print 1958) (Fritz Machlup). Crafting substantive patent
law requires a balance between property rights and the public domain, which has long
been recognized in the central statutory doctrines of patentability. Although the utility
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cumulative. 153 For example, basic technology forms the basis for a variety of
applications in multiple technological fields; follow-on inventions can
improve the original discovery; and an invention can serve as a research tool
in the development of downstream inventions. Overly broad patentability
standards, especially those that result in the patenting of inventions that
either would have been developed without a patent or result in the issuance
of patents on inventions that are already in the public domain, result in
chilling follow-on research and development, and are likely to decrease
overall social welfare. 154
Following the above exposition on why overly expansive patentability
standards are undesirable, subparts A and B examine why the Federal Circuit
is likely to entrench the PTO's expansive take on substantive patent law.
Subpart C then discusses the likelihood that other legal actors in the patent
system will offset or correct an unwarranted evolution of substantive patent
law.
A. Lock-In Effect
Once the PTO begins determining patentability based on an expansive
rule, a susceptibility to lock-in may arise. The patent system is specifically
designed to encourage investment in innovation that is supposed to return
yields over the twenty-year term of the patent grant. Once an industry has
developed around a particular rule, the Federal Circuit may be concerned
with disrupting business investments and patent strategies created on the
reliance of thousands of patents issued by the PTO. 155 This may lead the
standard requires that in order to be patentable an invention must be useful, the Supreme
Court has stressed that allowing a patent on an invention whose use is yet to be known
"may confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development, without
compensating benefit to the public." Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
Further, the patentable subject matter requirement has a broad scope, but it does not
include phenomena of nature or abstract scientific principles, as the Supreme Court has
emphasized that the exclusion of these abstract scientific principles and phenomena of
nature allows these "basic tools" of science and technology to be available for all
scientists to draw upon. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67, 71-72 (1972).
153 See generally Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants:
Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1991, 29, 29.
154 See supra note 11.
155 The Supreme Court has shown concern for disrupting "the settled expectations of
the inventing community" in several opinions. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 739 (2002) ("[C]ourts must be cautious before
adopting changes that disrupt the settled expectations of the inventing community."); see
also NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, REAPING THE BENEFITS OF
GENOMIC AND PROTEOMIC RESEARCH: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION,
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Federal Circuit to entrench the PTO's expansionary views on substantive
patent law even if the court believes that the PTO's substantive standard is
suboptimal.
The propensity for lock-in increases if the Federal Circuit is not given, in
a timely manner, the opportunity to consider whether the PTO's expansive
views on substantive law are desirable. The longer the time lag between the
PTO's implementation of its views and the Federal Circuit's opportunity to
review the Agency's viewpoints, the greater the chances for lock-in. There
are several reasons why the Federal Circuit may have limited opportunities to
revisit the PTO's expansive standard. First, the asymmetric review of PTO
determinations means that the Federal Circuit cannot immediately review a
pro-patentee substantive rule. Instead, the Federal Circuit can only review a
pro-patentee legal rule once the erroneously granted patents have been
asserted during patent litigation and also make their way through prolonged
district court litigation. This process, on average, can take close to a decade.
Second, certain legal doctrines are infrequently litigated during patent
infringement suits or declaratory judgment actions. For example, a recent
study of litigated patent cases revealed that a lack of patentable subject
matter accounted for only 0.7% of the invalid patents. 156 The majority of
developments of this doctrine come from Federal Circuit review of patent
denials, not patent grants. 157 The dearth of opinions stemming from patent
litigation addressing patentable subject matter has a negative feedback
effect-the PTO is likely to exercise substantial discretion with respect to
patentable subject matter doctrine because of the lack of guidance from the
Federal Circuit. While the Federal Circuit could attempt to fill this legal void
by considering the issue of patentable subject matter sua sponte, 158 the
AND PUBLIc HEALTH 101 (2006) (estimating that over 33,000 DNA-related patents have
been granted).
156 Allison & Lemley, supra note 12, at 208 tbl.1 (the most routinely asserted
grounds are obviousness (42.0%) and novelty (31.1%)). For an excellent discussion on
why litigants may shy away from asserting patentable subject matter as a ground for
invalidating a patent, see Eileen M. Kane, Patent Ineligibility: Maintaining a Scientific
Public Domain, 80 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 519, 528-29 (2006).
157 Allison & Lemley, supra note 12, at 203 (noting that patentable subject matter
cases "are more likely to arise in appeals from the PTO than in normal litigation"); John
R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, How Federal Circuit Judges Vote in Patent Validity
Cases, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 745, 748 (1999) (noting a "subject matter bias introduced"
into their dataset of litigated patents by "excluding appeals from the PTO").
158 Most recently, the panel of judges did so in In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed.
Cir. 2007), a case involving the patentability of a process for ensuring that disputes
relating to legal documents, such as wills or contracts, are resolved through arbitration.
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appellate court is unlikely to routinely do so as several Federal Circuit judges
have expressed their disapproval of such action. 15 9
Third, the Federal Circuit may not be given the opportunity to review the
PTO's expansive views on substantive patent law even if the substantive
standard is frequently asserted during patent litigation. The majority of patent
litigation is between companies that hold patents in the same or closely
related technological fields.160 Once an industry has adapted to a specific
legal rule, it may be more likely to favor its continuance, 16 1 as transitioning
to a new legal regime is costly. Thus, accused patent infringers may be less
inclined to make arguments that affect broad swaths of patent rights as they
may fear that such a challenge would also call into question the validity of
159 See In re Comiskey, No. 2006-1286, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 400, at *12-13
(Fed. Cir. Jan. 13, 2006) (Moore, J., Newman, J., and Rader, J., dissenting). Although In
re Comiskey cited the Supreme Court case, SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943),
for the proposition that it is proper for the court to consider new issues not relied upon by
the Agency, 499 F.3d at 1372, In re Daneshvar cited Chenery for the proposition that
"we are limited to reviewing the grounds relied on by the agency." No. 2009-1475, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 3149, at *5 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 18, 2010). There are, of course, good public
policy reasons why courts do not routinely consider issues sua sponte. Courts benefit
from the parties developing the record, doing thorough legal research, and responding to
each other's legal arguments. The workload of judges limits their ability to conduct
routinely thorough research on issues that were not briefed. Even beyond judicial
economy arguments, fundamental fairness to the parties also weighs against judges
considering issues sua sponte. See In re Lee, 277 F.3d 1338, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
("Consideration by the appellate tribunal of new agency justifications deprives the
aggrieved party of a fair opportunity to support its position; thus review of an
administrative decision must be made on the grounds relied on by the agency."); In re
Margolis, 785 F.2d 1029, 1032 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("In the interest of an orderly and fair
administrative process, it is inappropriate for this court to consider rejections that had not
been considered by or relied upon by the Board."). See generally Barry A. Miller, Sua
Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive Litigants of an Opportunity to Be
Heard, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1253 (2002).
160 There is a growing contingency of litigation involving non-practicing entities.
However, because these entities do not sell any commercial products, they are unlikely to
ever be sued by a patent holder. As such, they have almost no incentive to cut back on
expansive patent law doctrine.
161 Consider the example of the pharmaceutical industry, which relies heavily on
patent protection to recoup the research and development costs of developing drugs. This
industry often makes determinations about which compound to seek FDA approval of ten
to fifteen years before the commercial product will come to market. The patentability of
the compound factors heavily into the companies' decisions on whether or not to pursue
FDA approval of a compound. Thus, the pharmaceutical industry has strong preferences
to minimize changes to the law, as changes to the law may jeopardize their ability to
secure patents and the validity of the patents they have already obtained.
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their own patents. 162 At least one scholar has argued that this is a reason why
patentable subject matter is not more frequently asserted during patent
litigation. 163 If a patent is invalidated on the basis of patentable subject
matter, it is likely that a number of other patents that are not involved in the
litigation will also be rendered invalid by the decision.
Take, for example, gene patents. Despite the prolonged and intense
public debate regarding the patenting of genes' 64 and the fact that the PTO
has been issuing gene patents for over twenty-five years, 165 a court only
recently considered whether DNA gene sequences, particularly the so-called
162 Cf Rai, supra note 4, at 1075 ("Although patent bar members represent both
patent plaintiffs and patent defendants, both plaintiffs and defendants are often patent
holders. Thus, while a patent lawyer may attack the particular patents held by her
opponent, she is unlikely to make more sweeping legal and policy arguments that
emphasize the problems caused by strong, or numerous, patents.").
163 See Kane, supra note 45, at 726. But see Golden, supra note 5, at 683-84
(arguing that patent holders are more frequently arguing for stricter definitions of
patentable subject matter as amicus curiae). However, these arguments appear to be
limited to amicus curiae at this point. Importantly, the majority of recent cases before the
Federal Circuit asserting patentable subject matter have been patent denials (i.e., the
PTO, not patent holders, was arguing that the invention in question did not constitute
patentable subject matter). See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc)
(holding that patentable processes must be tied to a machine or impart a physical
transformation); ."); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (holding that a
"transitory, propagating signal... cannot be patentable subject matter"); In re Comiskey,
499 F.3d at 1378 ("[T]he present statute does not allow patents to be issued on particular
business systems-such as a particular type of arbitration-that depend entirely on the
use of mental processes.").
164 For a general discussion of the debate regarding gene patents, see Linda J.
Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and
Nonobvious Reconceptualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REv. 303,
305-09 (2002); Leon R. Kass, Triumph or Tragedy? The Moral Meaning of Genetic
Technology, 45 Am. J. JuRis. 1 (2000); Pilar N. Ossorio, The Human Genome As
Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal Nonsense?, 35 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 425
(2007).
165 The PTO has made it clear that it believes genes are patentable. See Utility
Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001) ("An isolated and
purified DNA molecule that has the same sequence as a naturally occurring gene is
eligible for a patent because (1) an excised gene is eligible for a patent as a composition
of matter or as an article of manufacture because that DNA molecule does not occur in
that isolated form in nature, or (2) synthetic DNA preparations are eligible for patents
because their purified state is different from the naturally occurring compound."); see,
e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008 (filed Nov. 30, 1984) (issued Oct. 27, 1987) (regarding
DNA sequences encoding erythropoietin); U.S. Patent No. 4,431,740 (filed June 8, 1982)
(issued Feb. 14, 1984) (regarding vectors for human insulin genes).
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breast cancer genes, constitute patentable subject matter.166 Noticeably, the
parties that filed the lawsuit arguing that gene patents are not patentable
subject matter are not entities that own patents in the biotechnology field but
are instead the American Civil Liberties Union and the Public Patent
Foundation. 167 While the district court invalidated the claims to "isolated and
purified" genes on the basis that genes did not constitute patentable subject
matter, most scholars believe it is unlikely that the Federal Circuit or the
Supreme Court will remove gene patents entirely from the patent system
because of settled expectations-the PTO has issued over tens of thousands
of gene patents and the biotechnology industry has operated under the
assumption that genes constitute patentable subject matter for close to a
quarter century. 168
B. Skewed Distribution and Asymmetric Review
While the previous subpart explored why the Federal Circuit may
knowingly entrench the PTO's patent-protective views on substantive patent
law, this subpart examines how the asymmetric review of PTO decisions,
along with biased PTO decision making, is likely to result in the Federal
Circuit unknowingly enunciating expansive legal standards.' 69
Most obviously, the Federal Circuit will not always arrive at the correct
decision; the appellate court will, at times, err in deciding cases.170 However,
166 Judge Sweet of the Southern District of New York held that "isolated and
purified" genes did not constitute patentable subject matter. See Ass'n for Molecular
Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 702 F. Supp. 2d 181, 232 (S.D.N.Y.
2010). This case is currently on appeal before the Federal Circuit.
167 American Civil Liberties Union and Public Patent Foundation filed the lawsuit
on behalf of researchers, genetic counselors, women patients, cancer survivors, breast
cancer and women's health groups, and scientific associations representing 150,000
genetics, pathologists, and laboratory professionals. See Ass 'n for Molecular Pathology,
702 F. Supp. 2d at 183, 186-89.
168 See, e.g., Helen M. Berman & Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, Reflections on the Science
and Law of Structural Biology, Genomics, and Drug Development, 53 UCLA L. REv.
871, 892 (2006).
169 Jonathan Masur also explores how the skewed distribution of cases in patent
denials may lead the Federal Circuit to expand substantive patent law. He appears to limit
his analysis to when random Federal Circuit error or deviations in panel make-up will
lead the court to overturn an invalid patent denial. Masur, supra note 17. In addition, I
explore how the evaluative and decisional process of Federal Circuit decision making can
be affected by skewed distribution of cases in patent denials, also leading the court to
expand substantive patent law standards.
170 The sources of potential error are beyond the scope of this paper but could be the
result of the court misconstruing the technology at issue or could be the result of the PTO
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the skewed distribution of patent denials means that Federal Circuit error is
more likely to result in the unwarranted expansion than the unwarranted
restriction of legal doctrine. 171 If the PTO's views on substantive patent law
were guided purely by its mission statement, the Agency would instruct its
examiners to use the non-biased standard. Even under non-biased PTO
decision making, the distribution of patent denials contains many more
invalid than valid patents, as the inventions at issue in patent denials have
already been screened for patentability by both patent examiners and the
BPAI. The tendency of the PTO to take an expansionary view of substantive
patent law will further skew the distribution of patent denials above the non-
biased standard. Since the PTO has interpreted and developed substantive
law in a patent-protective direction, the overwhelming majority of patents
that are denied by the Agency, even erroneously, are invalid (above the non-
biased standard). Assuming that the Federal Circuit is itself unbiased and
likely to err equally along the continuum of cases appealed before it (except
at the extremes), the highly skewed distribution of patent denials before the
Federal Circuit means that appellate court error is likely to result in the
erroneous reversal of a patent denial (the unjustified expansion of legal
doctrine) rather than the erroneous affirmation of a patent denial
(unwarranted restriction of legal doctrine).
Along the same vein, the Federal Circuit's decisional process may be
affected by the unidirectional review of PTO determinations. Because the
distribution of patent denials on appeal contains many more invalid than
valid patents, the appellate court should overwhelmingly affirm the PTO. Yet
the Federal Circuit may find it challenging to reverse the PTO only at a rate
that corresponds with Agency error, as all that is being asked of the court is
to find fault in PTO decision making. Every patent denial involves a case in
which the patent applicant is asserting that the PTO erroneously denied
patent protection-that the PTO defined the patentability standards too
lawyers not clearly presenting the legal issues at hand. See Nard & Duffy, supra note 7,
at 1632 (suggesting that appellate court error could stem from one-sided poor
representation); Rai, supra note 4, at 1053-54 (arguing that the Federal Circuit erred on a
factual question due to lack of technical expertise and turned this factual error into a
generalizable legal principle).
171 Of course, Federal Circuit error will not always produce a shift in the scope of
the legal doctrines. Sometimes Federal Circuit error may affect only the outcome of the
case at issue. However, even when the Federal Circuit errs only on factual
determinations, it may also affect the legal standards. See Rai, supra note 4, at 1053-54
(arguing that the Federal Circuit erred on a factual question due to lack of technical
expertise and turned this factual error into a generalizable legal principle).
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restrictively. 172 As such, the Federal Circuit is under one-way demands to
implement patentability standards that favor patent applicants (i.e., are
expansive in nature).173 With doctrines that are rarely litigated outside of the
PTO context, the Federal Circuit is not being asked to do the opposite-to
restrict the scope of the substantive standards. Thus, with respect to patent
denials, the Federal Circuit is under systematic pressure to shift the
patentability standards in a patent-protective direction.
Regardless of whether the Federal Circuit expands or restricts legal
doctrine, the appellate court may have the opportunity to revisit its decision
in the future. Yet, the nature of the asymmetric review process is likely to
result in the Federal Circuit more frequently revisiting its decisions that
restrict, when compared with those that expand the law, especially for
doctrines that are rarely asserted during patent litigation. The resulting
outcome of this process is that the law will be further pushed in the
expansionary direction. Imagine, for example, that the Federal Circuit
decides to substantially restrict the scope of patentable subject matter by
holding that methods of gene testing, such as the tests that identify BRCA1
and BRCA2 breast and ovarian cancer susceptibility genes, are unpatentable.
Diagnostic companies who have had their patent denied by the PTO's
implementation of the new standard may appeal the decision to the Federal
Circuit, arguing that the court's holding is too broad and that at least a subset
of inventions that fall under the umbrella of the new standard, such as
methods of gene testing that have a therapeutic effect on the patients, should
remain patentable. These appeals provide the Federal Circuit with
172 Of course, the patent applicant could appeal a large range of issues that are not
limited to substantive patent law issues but also include factual errors or procedural
issues. For example, the patent applicant may argue that the PTO erred in what a prior art
reference disclosed. This is a question of fact. In re Napier, 55 F.3d 610, 613 (Fed. Cir.
1995). Conversely, a patent applicant could argue that the PTO made a procedural error.
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 185 (2006) (prohibiting the grant of a patent to a person who has
filed a foreign patent application and failed to obtain a required license from the PTO).
173 This point has been made with respect to the asymmetric reviewability of
criminal law issues. In criminal law, the government is barred from seeking appeal of a
number of adverse rulings. In contrast, the criminal defendant has strong incentives to
appeal adverse rulings. See Ian R. Macneil, A View from the South, 7 CAN. Bus. L.J. 426,
437-38 (1982) ("[The limited ability of the government to appeal adverse criminal law
rulings] results in an imbalance whereby reviewing courts are under steady, relatively
one-way demands to change or implement criminal law in directions favouring the
criminal defendant .... It is difficult to believe that over a period of time this leaves the
substance of legal development unaffected.").
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opportunities to reconsider its decision or at least limit its reach. 174 In
contrast, imagine that the Federal Circuit substantially enlarges the scope of
patentable subject matter by holding that methods of gene testing are
patentable. Because patent grants are not subject to immediate judicial
review and the doctrine of patentable subject matter is not frequently asserted
during patent litigation, the court may not be asked to reconsider or limit its
decision. In fact, the Federal Circuit is likely to be asked to do the exact
opposite. The majority of appeals raising the issue of patentable subject
matter will likely be patent applicants who have had their patent denied
under the new standard and will be urging the court to push the standard in
an even further expansive direction, such as to also allow for expansive
patenting of business methods. As such, the dynamic effect of the
asymmetric review of PTO determinations creates an additional pressure on
the Federal Circuit to expand the scope of the patentability requirements.
C. Congress and the Supreme Court
If the patentability standards continue to expand over time, institutional
actors other than the PTO and the Federal Circuit may attempt to adjust
them. As in other areas of federal law, an unwarranted expansion of legal
doctrine may be corrected by statutory clarification or the Supreme Court.
Yet there are specific characteristics of the patent system that limit the ability
of both Congress and the highest Court to perform this function. Congress
has stepped in from time to time to correct patent law standards that have
gone astray. 175 However, Congress's last overhaul of the patent system was
close to sixty years ago. Despite growing unrest with substantive patent law,
recent congressional action in the patent arena, especially in comparison with
other intellectual property areas such as copyright, has been limited.176 In the
last five years there have been a number of patent reform bills that have been
introduced in Congress, but none have been passed. Stalled congressional
action has largely been blamed on disagreement between the two major
interest groups in patent law-the pharmaceutical industry and
information/communication technology firms.177
174 But see Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting, supra note 33, at 1570 (noting a
"repeat-player disadvantage" whereby lawyers frequently appearing before the Federal
Circuit may be reluctant to reargue issues out of concern for themselves or their clients
being on the receiving end of court criticism).
175 See, e.g., Nard, supra note 4, at 68-77 (describing congressional action in patent
law to correct jurisprudence that has gone awry).
176 See Long, supra note 19, at 1966 & nn.l-2.
177BURK & LEMLEY, supra note 35, at 101 ("The pharmaceutical and
biotechnology industries opposed virtually all elements of patent reform directed at
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It may be more likely that the Supreme Court could play an active role in
the correction of substantive patent law standards. The certiorari petition
process allows the Court to stay abreast of the evolution of legal standards by
lower courts while also giving the Court the freedom to pick and choose
which legal issues it believes are ripe for review. 178 Yet, it is more difficult
for the Court to recognize when patent law standards are in need of
readjustment than when other legal standards have gone astray. The
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit over patent law claims limits the
ability of the Supreme Court to rely on recent circuit splits as a signal of
which legal issues are in need of review. 179 While lawyers attempt to make
up for this deficiency by relying on aged Supreme Court opinions and
appellate precedents that pre-date the Federal Circuit, it is difficult to be
convincing with old case law. 180
VI. SOLUTIONS
The previous Parts have determined that the PTO must develop its own
views of substantive patent law, identified a patent-protective bias in these
views, and explored why the Federal Circuit may entrench the PTO's overly
permissive stance on substantive patent law. Congress has several tools at its
disposal for countering or eliminating the PTO's expansive substantive
patent law views resulting from the Agency's financial incentive to grant
patents and the unidirectional review of its determinations. Here, subpart A
examines the possibility of implementing symmetric review of PTO
determinations, and subpart B explores potential solutions designed to curb
the PTO's financial incentives to grant patents.
abuse.... On the other side, the software, electronics, Internet, and telecommunications
industries generally lined up behind reform, but expressed skepticism toward those few
reforms the pharmaceutical industry supported .. "),
178 See generally Golden, supra note 5 (arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court should
not be the final arbitrator of the law but should instead serve as a course-corrector to the
Federal Circuit).
179 Nard & Duffy, supra note 7, at 1644 (noting that Supreme Court intervention in
patent law is difficult to obtain because of the lack of recent circuit splits). While the
Court appears in part to make up for this deficiency by inviting the Department of Justice,
through the Solicitor General of the United States, to file a brief analyzing the petition,
this process is hardly a substitute for inter-circuit conflict. David C. Thompson &
Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition
Procedures: The Call for Response and the Callfor the Views of the Solicitor General,
16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 237, 281 (2009) (noting that the Supreme Court is more likely to
call for the views of the Solicitor General in intellectual property cases).
180 Dreyfuss, Pathological Patenting, supra note 33, at 1571.
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A. Symmetric Review of PTO Determinations
Under the current system, PTO determinations are only subject to
immediate judicial review when the PTO denies a patent. If the PTO grants a
patent, its actions will go uncontested for many years, if ever. Because the
PTO seeks to limit its litigation costs and chances of reversal, the Agency has
an incentive to interpret, apply, and develop the law in a patent-protective
direction. Congress could alter this dynamic and balance the Federal
Circuit's review of PTO decisions by enacting an administrative proceeding
that allows third parties to challenge the validity of granted patents on the
basis of all the patentability standards.181 Importantly, the losing party (either
the patent holder or a third party challenger) of a post-grant review
proceeding must be able to appeal the PTO's decision to the Federal
Circuit.182 In this way, aggrieved parties can immediately appeal PTO
decisions to either grant or deny a patent.
Balanced judicial review would constrain the PTO, especially in areas
where the Agency has substantial discretion. As there is then less incentive to
take an expansive view on substantive issues, the Agency will be less likely
to fill legal voids with patent-protective rules. Furthermore, doctrines such as
patentable subject matter, which are not frequently asserted during patent
infringement suits, would benefit from further court development, as third
parties utilize the post-grant system to force greater clarity in the law.
Pressure on the Federal Circuit to expand substantive law would also wane.
The distribution of patent denials would be less skewed towards invalid
patents, as the PTO examiners will no longer be using overly permissive
standards to determine patentability. A controversial decision by the PTO to
expand patent law will be challenged more quickly, limiting the chances for
181 This includes novelty, nonobviousness, patentable subject matter, utility and the
disclosure requirements. Jonathan Masur has also advocated for a third party challenge
although he argues for a pre-grant system. See Masur, supra note 17.
182 The PTO's post-grant decision should not be entitled to substantial deference.
Giving deference to the PTO's legal determinations in post-grant decisions, when no such
deference is afforded to the PTO's substantive patent law views in patent denials, is
likely to result in exacerbating the Agency's tendency to interpret, apply, and develop
substantive law in a patent-protective direction. If the PTO decides a close legal issue in
favor of granting a patent, then a third party will challenge the validity of the granted
patent in a post-grant review proceeding. The PTO will uphold the patent, as the patent
was granted under the PTO's official standard, and the third party will appeal the
decision to the Federal Circuit. The Federal Circuit will then be forced to give deference
to the PTO's expansive legal standard. In contrast, if the PTO decides a close legal issue
in favor of denying a patent, an aggrieved patent applicant will appeal the decision
immediately to the Federal Circuit. The appellate court is in a better position to overrule
the PTO, as no deference is afforded to the PTO's legal determinations in patent denials.
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lock-in. Third parties will no longer have to wait to be subject to
infringement action or meet the criteria to file a declaratory judgment action
to oppose the validity of an expansive PTO rule, but can instead use the post-
grant review system. 183
While allowing members of the public to challenge the validity of
granted patents on the basis of any substantive patent law standard will
temper the PTO's expansionary bias, a post-grant review system must also
guard against providing third parties--especially a patentee's competitors-
too great an incentive to challenge issued patents. Without some sort of
protection, competitors, especially larger businesses, could continually
challenge the validity of their rivals' patents, creating a cloud of uncertainty
around the patent. It is possible that such abuses could result in devaluing
issued patents to the point that inventors may no longer have the incentive to
partake in research and development. Thus, including cost-shifting
provisions for irresponsible, or even malicious, actions could help to curb
these potential abuses.
Fortunately, Congress could implement this post-grant review system
with minor changes to existing law. Presently, third parties can challenge the
validity of granted patents in a reexamination proceeding before the PTO. 184
While these proceedings are not frequently used, in part because only patents
and printed publications that refute novelty and nonobviousness can serve as
a basis for reexamination, they do provide the basic framework for the post-
grant review system described in this Article. Congress could utilize the post-
grant review system of trademarks at the PTO, and the post-grant patent
review system in Europe, which has been in effect for nearly thirty years, as
guidance for designing such a patent system in the United States. 185
183 However, it is unlikely that all third parties will have standing before the Federal
Circuit.
184 The PTO has two procedures that provide a limited administrative procedure for
reviewing granted patent applications, ex parte and inter partes reexamination. 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 303 (2006). Both of these procedures suffer from having narrow substantive
grounds for review and strict estoppel provisions. Thus, neither could possibly serve to
balance the review of PTO determinations. Ex parte reexamination bars the participation
of a third party once the PTO has determined whether a reexamination should commence.
37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2010) ("The active participation of the ex parte reexamination
requester ends with the reply pursuant to § 1.535, and no further submissions on behalf of
the reexamination requester will be acknowledged or considered."). Inter partes
reexamination allows for third party participation but in a limited manner-the third party
has the right to file written comments addressing "issues raised by the Office action or
the patent owner's response." 37 C.F.R. § 1.947 (2010). These problems have had a
dramatic effect on the number of reexamination requests. See supra note 117.
185 Several scholars have extensively explored design aspects of a post-grant
opposition system. See MICHAEL A. CARRIER, INNOVATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY,
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B. Eliminating the Financial Incentives to Expand Substantive Patent
Law
Presently, the PTO budget is set to the amount of its projected revenue
from user fees. As a result, the PTO overwhelmingly garners its patent-
operating budget through patent examination and post-allowance fees.
However, the fee structure of the PTO is such that fees from patent
examinations cover less than one-third of the Agency's cost for performing
this service. In contrast, the post-allowance fees the PTO collects are pure
profit-these services cost the PTO practically nothing. Thus, the PTO has
strong financial incentives to grant patents and this incentive systematically
pushes the Agency's views on substantive patent law in the patent-protective
direction. Congress could eliminate or counter these financial pressures by
either aligning the fees with the costs per service, funding the PTO from
direct appropriations, or restructuring the fees at the PTO.
1. Align Fees with Costs
Congress could decrease the PTO's financial incentive to expand
substantive patent law by aligning the actual costs of examination with the
fees for the service. 186 The large disparity between examination fees and cost
at the PTO is somewhat of an anomaly within patent systems. For example,
the PTO's counterpart in Europe, the European Patent Office, charges over
three times the amount that the PTO does to examine patent applications.' 87
As the actual fees paid to the PTO for examination of a patent application are
HARNESSING THE POWER OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST LAW 205-230
(2009); Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a Viable Administrative
Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 93-117 (1997).
186 Congress has recently considered giving the PTO fee-setting authority. Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111 th Cong. § 11 (a) (2009); Patent Reform Act of 2009,
S. 515, 11 1th Cong. § 9(a) (2009). These patent reform bills include a provision that
gives the PTO the ability to adjust fees based on their analysis of the costs of providing a
service. Importantly, these bills also provide for oversight to the PTO fee-setting
authority by requiring the process to include involvement by the public, the Patent Public
Advisory Committee, and the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
187 The basic online filing fee is 105 euros, the search fee is 1,105 euros, and the
examination fee is 1,480 euros. See Schedule of Fees, EPOLINE.ORG,
http://www.epoline.org/portal/portal/default/epoline.Scheduleoffeesjsessionid=575E 82 2
2428724575C9301130FB4E5A.jbossportalepolineprod-l (last visited Dec. 22,
2010). Using a conversion rate of 1.3669 dollars per euro, the total filing, search, and
examination fee at the European Patent Office is $3,685. The PTO charges $1,090 for the
same services.
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a fraction of the overall cost of securing a patent,188 modest increases to the
examination fees should not have a significant, negative impact on patent
filings. 189 The major drawback to this proposal is that the PTO's financial
incentives to expand the standards of patentability will likely remain even
when the disparity between examination cost and fees is extinguished. The
PTO may still have an incentive to develop overly permissive views on
substantive patent law because the PTO will still derive a substantial portion
of its budget from post-allowance fees.
Beyond merely aligning the PTO's cost with its fees for examination, the
fee structure of the PTO could be modified so that the Agency does not
derive a substantial portion of its budget from post-allowance fees. Small
changes-such as implementing additional pre-grant fees or restricting the
amount of renewal fees the PTO can retain-could significantly decrease the
PTO's financial incentives to grant patents. The largest drawback of
restructuring the PTO fee schedule is that any fee structure involves
balancing, not only the incentives of the PTO, but also of the patentees. 190
While it may be difficult to develop a fee schedule that optimizes both patent
filers and Agency behavior, it is clear that there is ample room for
improvement over the current system.
188 A utility patent application of minimal complexity costs on average $10,000 to
prepare and prosecute while a utility patent application of relative complexity costs on
average $16,000 to prepare and prosecute. AIPLA, REPORT OF ECONOMIC SURVEY 2009,
at 1-110-12 (2009).
189 Recent studies have shown that, at least with respect to low patent fees, patent
demand is relatively inelastic. See Timothy K. Wilson, Patent Demand-A Simple Path
to Patent Reform, 2 INT'L IN-HOUSE COUNS. J. 806, 810-12 (2008) (arguing that filing
fees need to be raised significantly in order to reach the elastic portion of the demand
curve); Gadtan de Rassenfosse & Bruno van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, On the Price
Elasticity of Demand for Patents (European Ctr. for Advanced Research in Econ. &
Statistics, Working Paper No. 2008-031 (2008)), available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/ecawpaper/2008_5F031.htm (finding that the demand
for patents is responsive to price, but relatively inelastic).
190 Most patent offices have some mix of pre- and post-grant fees. A mixture of high
and low pre- and post-grant fees can be found in various national patent offices. For
example, the United States and Switzerland have low renewal fees whereas Greece and
Germany have relatively high renewal fees as the patents age. Gadtan de Rassenfosse &
Bruno van Pottelsberghe, The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence 7
(European Ctr. for Advanced Research in Econ. & Statistics, Working Paper No. 2010-
023 (2010)), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfln?abstract-id = 1694924.
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2. Partially Eliminate Self-Financing of the PTO
In the end, the better option for eliminating the PTO's financial incentive
to expand patentability requirements may be to fund the PTO, at least
partially, from direct appropriations. If the PTO funding does not scale
directly with its revenue collection, the Agency's financial incentive to
interpret, apply, and develop substantive law in a patent-protective direction
would be substantially curtailed. 191 There are other benefits to the
elimination of the self-financing of the PTO. The most significant benefit is
that it would force Congress to figure out how much money the PTO needs
to provide its expected output and then fund the Agency accordingly. There
is no reason to believe that the amount of money the PTO spends should be
set to the amount of money that the PTO collects. Second, without having to
consider how the fee-structure would skew the decision making of the PTO,
Congress or the Agency itself could more easily experiment with the
structure of patent fees. The historical belief that innovative activity is
maximized by increasing the number of patent applications, which appears to
be the reasoning underlying the current PTO fee-structure, 192 is no longer
widely accepted.193
However, there may be concern that Congress would fail to adequately
fund the Agency. The PTO's budget has grown over four-fold since it
became funded on user fees. Even though the PTO is and remains chronically
underfunded, Congress has, on several occasions, refused to increase PTO
fees. To address this concern, the PTO could be partially funded though user
fees and partially funded through direct appropriations. If the amount of
money the PTO can collect through fees is capped, the Agency's financial
incentives to grant patents should be tempered. Further, Congress may be
more willing to adequately fund the Agency if only a portion of its budget is
being directly appropriated.
191 To the extent that it costs the PTO more to deny than grant a patent, the PTO, if
it wants to use resources for things other than reviewing patent applications, may still
have a small financial incentive to grant patents.
192 de Rassenfosse & van Pottelsberghe, supra note 190, at 3-4.
193 There is growing evidence that patents are no longer used to protect innovation
activity. Instead, patents are being used to prevent rivals from patenting related
inventions, preventing suits and keeping one's own freedom to operate, enhancing one's
own reputation as a successful innovator, or earning licensing revenues. See generally
Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 1063 (2008); Wesley M. Cohen, Richard R. Nelson & John P. Walsh, Protecting
Their Intellectual Assets: Appropriability Conditions and Why US. Manufacturing Firms
Patent (or Not) (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7552 (2000)),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7552.
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VII. CONCLUSION
The PTO is largely thought to play a negligible role in the development
of substantive patent law. The Agency lacks substantive rulemaking powers,
and its legal determinations are afforded no formal deference by its
reviewing court, the Federal Circuit. This Article argues that, nonetheless,
the PTO has a substantial effect on the development of substantive patent
law--one that exerts expansionary pressure on the contours of patent law.
The Agency has inevitable discretion that requires it to develop its own
views on substantive patent law. Yet, the PTO's relationship with the Federal
Circuit and its financial incentives result in the PTO taking an overly
permissive view on substantive patent law. Importantly, the PTO's patent-
protective views of substantive patent law and the unidirectional review of
the Agency's decisions in turn create pressure on the Federal Circuit to
enunciate expansive legal standards.

